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abstract. Public schools have generated some of the most far-reaching cases to come before the Supreme Court. They have involved nearly every major civil right and liberty found in
the Bill of Rights. The cases are often reﬂections of larger societal ills and anxieties, from segregation and immigration to religion and civil discourse over war. In that respect, they go to the
core of the nation’s values. Yet constitutional law scholars have largely ignored education law as a
distinct area of study and importance.
Justin Driver’s book cures that shortcoming, offering a three-dimensional view of how the
Court’s education law jurisprudence has evolved over the past century. The Court, once loath to
intervene in school affairs, increasingly recognized that students’ constitutional rights do not end
at the schoolhouse gate. But that extension has not been without limitations, pause, or controversy. Driver vividly narrates both the Court’s internal conversations and those occurring in
broader society. Most importantly, Driver helps the reader see how the Court’s decisions were
not preordained, could have gone a number of different ways, and heavily inﬂuenced the history
that followed.
This Book Review, however, argues that no account of the Court’s education precedent is
complete without a detailed examination of how the Court’s decisions have affected equal opportunity. The attempt to ensure equal educational opportunity is ultimately the tie that binds so
much of the Court’s precedent. Unfortunately, the Court’s doctrine on this score has not been
one of consistent expansion. In fact, too often the Court has limited students’ rights and, thus,
the educational opportunities they receive. This failure is clearest in two areas: those cases implicating a constitutional right to education and school desegregation.
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introduction
Justin Driver’s The Schoolhouse Gate: Public Education, the Supreme Court,
and the Battle for the American Mind excels in two key respects. As a book about
education law, it weaves together disparate doctrines and discrete issues into a
cogent whole. This is no small accomplishment, given the broad spectrum of
questions the Supreme Court has addressed in schools: racial segregation,
funding, immigration, free speech, religion, corporal punishment, suspension,
and LGBTQ rights. Reviewing over a century of cases, Driver highlights compelling themes that allow the reader to see the Court’s education cases as a
long, ongoing conversation about the extent to which the Court must defer to
educators while also protecting students’ rights and enforcing the Constitution.
Given the substance of these cases and their wide-ranging impact, Driver argues the Court’s education cases have been underappreciated and are, in fact,
potentially the most important venue in which the Court acts.1 The Schoolhouse
Gate puts education law on the map.
As a book about constitutional law, Driver’s work may be even more signiﬁcant. Driver aims to contest the growing conventional wisdom among academics that the Supreme Court is primarily a conservative institution that
merely follows public opinion and, thus, does not play a major role in shaping
society.2 He details a number of major school cases—from segregation to free
speech to immigration—in which the Court’s decisions were entirely at odds
with public opinion at the time they were released but managed to shift public
opinion over the course of time.3 He also recasts a number of cases that others
have critiqued as failures,4 convincingly arguing that the Court threaded a needle in those cases and delivered moderate opinions so as to avoid social back-

1.

2.

3.

4.

JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME COURT, AND
THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 9 (2018) (stating his thesis that public schools are
“the single most signiﬁcant site of constitutional interpretation”).
Driver points to BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009),
and MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004), as prime examples of this thinking. DRIVER, supra
note 1, at 439 n.35.
See, e.g., DRIVER, supra note 1, at 21-22 (pointing to ﬁve different countermajoritarian decisions by the Court on issues ranging from religious schools and prayer to desegregation and
undocumented students, all of which he analyzes in depth later in the book).
See, e.g., id. at 115-24 (emphasizing that Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007), could have
permitted even more egregious regulations of student speech and that the limited and narrow holding in the case did relatively little to restrict student speech).
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lash while still producing doctrinal victories for student rights.5 In sum, for
those not yet willing to give up on the Court, The Schoolhouse Gate is a breath
of fresh air.
The breadth and ambition of The Schoolhouse Gate are its greatest strengths.
But in an effort to construct a metanarrative, Driver treats all doctrines and issues as roughly equal in importance.6 The various cases appear as data points
in service of a larger story. Many scholars—including us—would argue that the
Court’s education cases are not equal. Some would insist free speech and religion cases have had the most signiﬁcant effect on public education, while others would emphasize the inﬂuence of discipline, discrimination, and desegregation cases.7 Rather than assign particular signiﬁcance to any single area, Driver
seeks to elevate the entire ﬁeld of education law—an important accomplishment indeed. But one area—equality of educational opportunity—gets too little
attention. Equality of educational opportunity includes the fundamental right
to an education and school-segregation law. We argue these two lines of equali-

5.

6.

7.

For instance, the Court’s student free speech cases following Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), appear contradictory and regressive, but
Driver argues that the Court’s decision in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260 (1988), permitting the school to excise certain stories from the school papers was not
nearly as confused as many argue today, nor was that case at odds with Board of Education,
Island Trees Union Free School District v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), which placed limits on the
school’s ability to remove books from the library. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 111-15. Driver’s
analysis does not eliminate all of our concerns regarding those cases, but he does lessen the
weight of those concerns. He fairly closes the chapter on free speech with a section demonstrating that “[w]hile Tinker is best construed as retaining vitality, that position should not
be mistaken for complacency.” Id. at 127. Driver similarly says that the Court’s decision in
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), which extended due process rights to suspended students,
must be assessed against a number of background factors, not solely against observers’
wishes for what the case should have said. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 153-58. While we would
still quibble about the extent to which Goss achieved meaningful substantive change, Driver’s point is well taken and worth making. For a discussion of those continuing concerns, see
Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Limit of Zero Tolerance in Schools, 99 MINN. L. REV. 823,
855 (2015), which notes that “the internal ﬂaws of Goss and the subsequent cabining of its
doctrine have resulted in due process practices that, as a practical matter, are often reduced
to a sham.”
Freedom of expression and school desegregation, for instance, clock in at sixty-nine and seventy-three pages, respectively, while the punishment and investigation of student misbehavior clock in at forty-four and ﬁfty-seven pages, respectively. More substantive comparisons
follow below in Section I.C.
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
111, 111 (2004) (arguing that without judicial action toward desegregation, equal education
opportunity “will never exist”); John H. Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEX.
L. REV. 321, 338 (1979) (contending that “free speech plays an important role in the child’s
development”).
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ty doctrine tower above the rest of education law. Deeper analysis of those two
lines of doctrine, moreover, would reveal that they have the potential to reshape the entire metanarrative undergirding education law if properly understood.
The Schoolhouse Gate’s introduction states:
One cannot plausibly claim to understand public education in the United States today . . . without appreciating how the Supreme Court’s decisions involving students’ constitutional rights shape the everyday realities of schools across the country. . . . At its core, this book argues
that the public school has served as the single most signiﬁcant site of
constitutional interpretation within the nation’s history.8
In exploring that thesis, the book treats the Court’s school cases as a series
of tussles that involve two recurring conﬂicts. One is the doctrinal conﬂict over
school authority. The Court consistently struggles to balance the clear requirements of the Constitution against the harms of interfering with and undermining school administrators.9 In other words, the scope and appropriateness of a
constitutional review of school policies is the major subtext of the Court’s
school cases.
The second is the conﬂict between society and the courts, with schools
stuck in the middle. Driver does not frame it exactly that way. Rather, he emphasizes that the Court has decided many of our nation’s most controversial
cultural issues in the school context.10 His conclusion regarding the importance
of education law follows naturally from that point. But the question remains:
why have schools played this role? The answer lies in public schools’ unique
ability to capture the “nation’s cultural imagination,” reﬂect its “social concerns,” and “illuminate[] both the hopes and the fears” of the people.11 Thus,
when cultural and constitutional conﬂicts arise, litigants naturally choose public schools as their battleﬁeld. This phenomenon alone justiﬁes Driver’s special
attention to education law as a distinct strand of the Court’s jurisprudence.
Driver explores both of these themes well, but, because of the scope of his
book, he does so at a level of abstraction. Respect for schools’ authority is
about managing institutional relationships, and problems arise any time the
Court reviews another branch of government’s actions. This is not unique to

8.

DRIVER, supra note 1, at 9.
Id. at 16-19.
10. Id. at 10-12.
11. Id. at 10-11.
9.
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education. Further, because cultural-legal wars will inevitably occur, so too will
school cases. The way the Court shapes actual educational opportunities and
experiences is another important part of the story. And understanding it requires a deeper examination of the theoretical and doctrinal underpinnings of
the Court’s cases, which we provide here.
The Schoolhouse Gate treats issues like school discipline, searches and seizures, desegregation, funding, and equal access as doctrinally and theoretically
distinct—bound together by the Court’s general concerns over judicial intervention and school authority. In doing so, Driver neglects the central unifying
concern of the Court’s most important cases: the nature and scope of the constitutional right to education.12 In the Court’s most signiﬁcant cases, the tension over school authority is an outgrowth of the substantive weight and signiﬁcance of the underlying right at stake—the right to education.13 If the Court
were to acknowledge such a right, it would have no choice but to intervene in
various educational contexts. Without that right, the Court is free to afford
considerable weight to policy implications and to tweak around the edges of
educational opportunity without ever fully validating the principle that the educational opportunity should be equal.14
In short, while school cases consistently force the Court to make tough decisions regarding judicial intervention and school authority, the most central
issue in the most important cases is whether the Constitution protects the right
to education. Our nation has long been committed to such a right.15 Various

12.

See infra Part II.
That right, as later sections argue, rests at the foundation of our democratic order. See infra
Part II.
14. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973) (expressing the
Court’s reluctance to recognize a right to education because of the legislative policies involved).
15. Derek W. Black, The Fundamental Right to Education, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1059, 1081-85
(2019); Kara A. Millonzi, Education as a Right of National Citizenship Under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1286, 1303 (2003); George
Washington, Eighth Annual Message of George Washington (Dec. 7, 1796),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washs08.asp
[https://perma.cc/9ZQ9-2WV3]
(“[A] primary object of such a [national university and a military academy] should be the
education of our youth in the science of government. In a republic what species of
knowledge can be equally important and what duty more pressing on its legislature than to
patronize a plan for communicating it to those who are to be the future guardians of the liberties of the country?”); cf. Thomas Jefferson, Sixth Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 2,
1806), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jeffmes6.asp [https://perma.cc/WX65
-38ST] (calling for public funding of education).
13.
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state constitutions have explicitly recognized it.16 The Court routinely alludes
to such a right.17 But it has never affirmatively recognized it. As a result, the
Court has condoned educational inequality as often as it has interrupted the
practice. This failure is the sad lynchpin that undergirds the Court’s most important cases.
This Review proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of The
Schoolhouse Gate and a critical assessment of its strengths, contributions, and
limitations. Part II identiﬁes the constitutional right to education as the most
doctrinally and theoretically important issue in education law. Part II then details the right to education’s implications in several of the Court’s most important school cases. And ﬁnally, Part III examines the Court’s schoolintegration jurisprudence, the area in which the right to equal education has
been contested most consistently and most deeply.

16.

See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (mandating the maintenance of a public-education system because “[i]ntelligence and virtue [are] the safeguards of liberty and the bulwark of a
free and good government”); MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“The stability of a republican
form of government depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it shall be the
duty of the Legislature to establish a general and uniform system of public schools.”); N.D.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (mandating the creation of a free public-education system because “[a]
high degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity and morality on the part of every voter in a
government by the people [is] necessary in order to insure the continuance of that government”); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 205 (Ky. 1989) (noting that
the constitutional convention of 1890 justiﬁed the education clause as essential to the “prosperity of a free people” and to “develop[ing] patriotism and understand[ing] our government”). John Adams authored the Massachusetts Constitution and placed an education
clause in it, making it the nation’s oldest clause of its kind. It provided that “diffus[ion of
education] generally among the body of the people [is] necessary for the preservation of
their rights and liberties.” MASS CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § II.
17. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (discussing the role of education in our democratic order and quoting several other Supreme Court cases); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68, 76 (1979) (“Public education, like the police function, ‘fulﬁlls a most fundamental obligation of government to its constituency.’” (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297
(1978))); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (accepting the State’s proposition
that “some degree of education is necessary . . . if we are to preserve freedom and independence”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (stating that education “is the very
foundation of good citizenship”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (“American
people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme
importance . . . .”).
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i. book overview
A. Comprehensive Coverage and Approach
The Schoolhouse Gate’s coverage is impressive. It persuasively puts to rest
the notion that public education does not involve signiﬁcant constitutional issues.18 It does. Driver’s thesis is that “schools should be deemed our most signiﬁcant theaters of constitutional conﬂict.”19 His book reveals how school cases
represent “the hopes and the fears that have captivated the American people
during the last century.”20 Chapter One makes clear the controversial nature of
school cases. The Court’s very ﬁrst education cases, like those of today, involved culturally divisive issues. From a doctrinal standpoint, the early cases are
scattered, but they share common ground as battles over major cultural issues.
Those cases waded into the racial, cultural, religious, and patriotic politics of
the day.
With that groundwork laid, Driver assigns the remaining chapters to each
of the Court’s major constitutional subjects as played out in the school context:
freedom of speech, student punishment, student searches, racial segregation,
equality of opportunity beyond race, and religion. Driver’s treatment of such
disparate subject matter and nearly all of the Court’s signiﬁcant school cases is
remarkable.21 In contrast, the leading education-law casebooks tend to provide
thin coverage of a large number of issues or to skew heavily toward one area of
the law.22 Michael and Sherelyn Kaufman’s Education Law, Policy, and Practice
18.

19.
20.
21.

22.

A typical constitutional law casebook, for instance, affords little to no attention to education
as a distinct topic of analysis. The typical approach is a short reprint of San Antonio v. Rodriguez—and maybe an even a shorter one of Plyler v. Doe—to establish that education is not a
fundamental right. See, e.g., CHARLES A. SHANOR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND RECONSTRUCTION 745 (3d ed. 2009); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 800 (18th ed. 2013). At least one case book does even less, using Rodriguez to make a point unrelated to education—that the Court would not accept fundamental rights grounded solely in equal protection. CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 743 (3d ed. 2009).
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 9.
Id. at 10.
The book covers the First Amendment rights to speech and free exercise of religion, due
process, cruel and unusual punishment, substantive due process, unreasonable search and
seizure, privacy, equal protection based on race, equal protection based on gender, immigration status, fundamental rights, and separation of church and state.
See, e.g., KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW (7th ed.
2009); STUART BIEGEL, EDUCATION AND THE LAW (2d ed. 2009); LAWRENCE F. ROSSOW &
JACQUELINE A. STEFKOVICH, EDUCATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2015); CHARLES
J. RUSSO, REUTTER’S THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, at v (8th ed. 2012); RICHARD S. VACCA
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and Derek Black’s Education Law: Equality, Fairness, and Reform are the only
ones that come close to both depth and full coverage.23 The Kaufmans’ book,
however, still focuses heavily on First Amendment issues, reducing all of equal
protection to a single chapter. Black’s book, while more evenly balanced, focuses on equality. Driver covers the full panoply of multiple constitutional subjects
with clear competency and deep insight. The book could easily serve as the
primary text for a class on education law or a perfect companion to a course using a casebook.
Driver’s treatment of individual cases follows a general pattern. First, he
offers the story behind each the case. His aim is to provide insight into the
broader social forces that led to the case, as well as plaintiffs’ individual stories
and motivations. For obvious reasons, the personal stories in old cases tend to
be thinner, but Driver offers details on newer cases that many readers will ﬁnd
novel and important.24 Second, he efficiently explains the basic doctrine of each
case and identiﬁes the battle lines between the parties and members of the
Court.25 In many instances, Driver’s explanations provide more clarity than the
Court itself did.26 Driver’s lucid framing of the cases allows even the lay reader
to move through multiple cases and eras without losing the narrative thread.
Third, he looks outward, surveying contemporaneous media and scholarly reactions to the Court’s decisions. This allows the reader to see each case in the
real-time social context in which the Court made each decision, free of the bias
of retrospect. Fourth, Driver regularly explores the possibility of alternate outcomes in the cases, considering the Court’s options as they stood at the time
and whether those options were viable.27 Finally, he provides a cogent conclud-

& WILLIAM C. BOSHER, JR., LAW AND EDUCATION: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND COURT DECISIONS (6th ed. 2003); MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW (5th ed.
23.
24.

25.
26.

27.

2012).
DEREK W. BLACK, EDUCATION LAW: EQUALITY, FAIRNESS, AND REFORM (2013); MICHAEL J.
KAUFMAN & SHERELYN R. KAUFMAN, EDUCATION LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE (2005).
See, e.g., DRIVER, supra note 1, at 293-94 (explaining the parent organizing that led to the
legal challenge in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701 (2007)); id. at 349-50 (telling how the plaintiff in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
watched his children stay home day after day because of the law that excluded them).
See, e.g., id. at 75-78 (drawing the battle lines on each of the standards involved in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
See, e.g., id. at 94-95 (explaining clearly what the Court held in Bethel School District No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), notwithstanding the fact that the Court had created new ambiguities).
Id. at 88-89 (considering a path not taken in Tinker); id. at 108-09 (considering an alternate
approach to school-newspaper doctrine); id. at 201 (considering the downside of an alternate approach to student searches).
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ing analysis examining whether the Court got it “right.”28 Throughout, Driver
exercises a restraint that other scholars often lack. This restraint serves a larger
objective: focusing the reader’s attention on the drama playing out in the cases.
B. Strengths and Major Contributions
Driver’s approach produces several important gems for the reader. First,
Driver humanizes the cases in ways that other scholars have not. He is forthright in this effort. In the introduction, he urges the reader to appreciate the
plaintiffs in these cases because the “students and their families who contest
school practices must often exhibit deep reservoirs of courage when the Supreme Court addresses their disputes.”29 He observes, and demonstrates
throughout his narrative, that these families “resist not only the wishes of local
educators but also the norms of their surrounding communities,” which can
respond with “insults, hate mail, intimidating telephone calls, and even death
threats.”30 In later chapters, Driver follows through with conﬁrming details.
The plaintiff group in Engel v. Vitale31—a school prayer case—started at ﬁfty
only to shrink to ﬁve by the time trial began.32 The Weismann family, in another prayer case, received so much hate mail after ﬁling their case that they
turned it into a scrapbook.33
Less explicit but equally effective is Driver’s humanization of the Court.
The path of least resistance in a book like Driver’s is to speak simply of “the
Warren Court,” “the Rehnquist Court,” or even more broadly just “the Court.”
This, of course, reduces the Court to a thing rather than a group of individuals
making incredibly difficult decisions. Driver does the opposite. For instance, he
begins the book with a wedding story that seems to have nothing to do with
litigation other than the fact that Justice Frankfurter was in attendance.34 But
during the course of the wedding, the bride, groom, and others directly excoriate Justice Frankfurter for his opinion in Minersville School District v. Gobitis35—

28.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

2312

Id. at 120-22 (arguing that in his assessment, the Court in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393
(2007), “unwisely betrayed the traditional First Amendment principle permitting restrictions on speech only if they are neutral with respect to viewpoint”).
Id. at 15.
Id.
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 365.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 3-5.
310 U.S. 586 (1940).

equality of opportunity and the schoolhouse gate

a case upholding schools’ authority to compel students to pledge allegiance to
the ﬂag.36 Frankfurter had reasoned that it was not the role of courts to overturn or second-guess educators’ decisions.37 The wedding attendees, however,
found it shocking that Frankfurter would ignore students’ rights and told him
so.38 Under the weight of the combative discussion, Frankfurter eventually lost
his composure and swore to never again discuss cases in social settings.39
Other depictions offer a fuller measure of the Justices, including those of ill
repute. Driver identiﬁes Justice McReynolds as a racist, anti-Semitic, and misogynistic man with a “nasty temperament,” while at the same time acknowledging that the Justice was more complex than those labels.40 Drawing on Justice McReynolds’s declaration that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the
State,”41 Driver notes that McReynolds was among “at least a few ﬁgures who,
while generally odious, were capable of admirable utterances.”42 Driver also
offers details about Justice Powell that help explain his enigmatic school decisions.43 And one of his most extended dives reveals how Justice Ginsburg
played a pivotal role on an otherwise all-male Court in a case involving the
strip search of a female middle-school student.44 In each of these cases, Driver
highlights that Supreme Court cases involve people—from those bringing and
deciding the cases to those watching from a distance.
By humanizing both the litigants and the Court, Driver also allows the
reader to see school cases as a conversation between the Court, schools, and the
families involved. This accomplishment alone will keep the book relevant well
into the future. Moreover, Driver helps scholars more fully appreciate the doctrine. He does this by consistently challenging conventional wisdom. For instance, scholars regularly criticize the Court in Brown v. Board of Education II45

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

44.
45.

DRIVER, supra note 1, at 5.
Id.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
See id. at 60-61.
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 61.
While Powell’s prior service as a school-board member is well known, Driver digs deeper,
developing Powell’s concerns about how busing “could devastate the sense of community
engendered when youngsters living in the same neighborhood attended the same school.”
Id. at 277. One need not agree with Powell to appreciate Driver’s humanizing efforts.
Id. at 226-30.
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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for requiring only that desegregation proceed with “all deliberate speed.”46
Driver recognizes that this phrase eventually became the excuse for districts to
delay desegregation, but he also emphasizes that the language was not immediately perceived that way.47 Brown II included other strong language demanding desegregation and, on the whole, represented a balanced approach to desegregation in light of the context—too slow for some and too rapid for
others.48 Similarly, Driver rejects the notion that the Court’s validation of bussing to achieve integration in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education49 provoked overwhelming outrage in white communities and was a failed
policy idea. Driver highlights that eighty-seven percent of “the parents of children who were bused to promote integration” viewed it positively,50 and he recounts how Charlotte residents perceived desegregation, not as a failure, but
“as a rousing success.”51
The most powerful challenges to conventional wisdom, however, come in
Driver’s exploration of alternative outcomes. His masterful hypotheticals and
contrapositives demonstrate just how much the Court has achieved and how
much we may now take for granted.52 Some of the most impressive examples
come from the most unexpected places.53 Driver shows how, against those
plausible possibilities, some of the Court’s holdings are far more impressive,
more disappointing, or less egregious than previously thought. In some of
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

53.

See generally Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 613-14 (1983) (discussing those criticisms of Brown II).
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 256-57.
Id. at 257 (quoting Editorial, Prompt and Reasonable, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1955, at 28, which
makes this point).
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 293.
Id. at 291.
Driver’s free speech chapter, for instance, takes on the Court’s hotly debated and most criticized student-speech cases. Driver argues that Tinker was more momentous than we appreciate in retrospect—“resist[ing], rather than ratif[ying], the era’s prevailing attitudes on
student dissent.” Id. at 84. The Court’s later cases do not curtail free speech as much as
many would normally argue. Id. at 125.
For instance, the Court today is often critiqued for demanding so little due process in Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), but Driver argues, based on the circumstances at the time, that
the Court could have just as easily done nothing. Instead, the Court took a major step to
vindicate the basic notion that the Constitution does apply in schools. DRIVER, supra note 1,
at 155-56. While we might still contest Driver’s account to some extent, he makes clear here
and elsewhere that we can mistakenly examine cases from a modern perspective that does
not fairly account for the conditions of the time. He similarly argues that Morse v. Frederick,
551 U.S. 393 (2007), “cannot be dismissed as an opinion that simply legitimated the status
quo.” DRIVER, supra note 1, at 121.
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these cases, Driver posits that had the Court done what some commentators
proposed, it would have triggered backlash and resentment.54 For instance,
with student-search cases, Driver argues that the Court’s low threshold for justifying student searches is not such a bad thing. Had the Court barred searches
or made them more onerous to justify, school administrators would have just
suspended students or restricted their movements and foregone searches.55 If
forced to choose between school exclusion and a search, students may prefer
the search, even if somewhat intrusive.56 On the other hand, he reasons that
the Court in Tinker v. Des Moines “could have quite plausibly adopted a rule
that afforded greater protection to students’ First Amendment rights than did
the reasonable-forecast-of-substantial-disruption test.”57 Thus, while Driver
defends Tinker,58 he also points out that the case is not the shining “high-water
mark” in student free speech that we often assume it to be.59
One does not have to agree with any of Driver’s particular arguments or
revel in any particular backstory to appreciate the overall service he does to the
subject matter. By humanizing the participants, contextualizing the issues, and
considering the alternatives, Driver forces the reader to measure the Court’s
cases not just against the reader’s own perspective and bias but against reality.
This makes it all but impossible to leave these cases without changing one’s
view a little—or at least acknowledging that the cases are too complex to have
full conﬁdence in any single perspective.
C. The Cutting-Room Floor
The doctrinal breadth and narrative depth of The Schoolhouse Gate, however, also come at a cost. Synthesizing the cases into a comprehensive metanarrative makes the book widely accessible but requires leaving out some analytical
threads and cases that are worth exploring. Driver can only devote so much attention to any single issue or case. As a result, the cases and the legal issues get
roughly equal treatment. This may make the relative treatment of a few cases
jump out for some readers.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

DRIVER, supra note 1, at 81-84.
Id. at 201 (citing William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 564 (1992)).
Id.
Id. at 88-91. He backs up this conclusion with lower-court decisions that were more aggressive prior to Tinker.
See supra note 52.
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 91.
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Take San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,60 which ranks
among the Supreme Court’s most important education cases. The Schoolhouse
Gate devotes thirteen pages to the case, roughly the same number of pages it
devotes to Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia,61 a case which few—
including many scholars—have heard of. While Vorchheimer involved the highly controversial operation of a male-only public high school, the Supreme
Court failed to reach a decision in the case, evenly splitting four-to-four.62
Driver discusses Vorchheimer to emphasize what can happen when the Court
fails to decide an important issue,63 a point well taken. Single-sex education
persisted and has even seen periods of expansion.64 But more important are
two more recent cases, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan65 and United
States v. Virginia,66 that severely restricted single-sex education.67 These cases,
however, understandably do not make an appearance in the book because they
arise in the context of higher education.
Driver’s treatment of Safford Uniﬁed School District No. 1 v. Redding68 is
similarly striking.69 The case does not add much to the canon of education doctrine. In it, the Court held that the strip search of a middle-school girl was un-

60.
61.
62.

63.

64.

65.
66.
67.

68.
69.

411 U.S. 1 (1973).
430 U.S. 703 (1977) (per curiam).
Id. at 703. The lower court had upheld the policy and the Court’s failure to reach a decision
acted as a practical affirmance. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 532 F.2d 880, 881 (3d Cir.
1976), aff’d by an equally divided court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 333 (describing the case as an “institutional obligation [that] remains unfulﬁlled”); id. at 339-40 (discussing the continuing debate over the “legitimacy of
single-sex public schools”).
J. Shaw Vanze, The Constitutionality of Single-Sex Public Education in Pennsylvania Elementary
and Secondary Schools, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1479, 1480 (2010) (discussing the increase in
single-sex education notwithstanding the Court’s holding in United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515 (1996)).
458 U.S. 718 (1982).
518 U.S. 515 (1996).
Justice Scalia lamented in his Virginia dissent that “[u]nder the constitutional principles announced and applied today, single-sex public education is unconstitutional” or, at best,
“functionally dead.” Id. at 595-96 (Scalia, J. dissenting). For an analysis of whether the
Court’s decision did portend the end of single-sex public education, see Kimberly J. Jenkins,
Constitutional Lessons for the Next Generation of Public Single-Sex Elementary and Secondary
Schools, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1953 (2006).
557 U.S. 364 (2009).
See DRIVER, supra note 1, at 219-30.
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reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.70 From the Court’s perspective, it
did little more than apply a twenty-year-old basic rule to a troubling set of
facts71—not the sort of thing the Supreme Court normally does. Driver appears
to include it, not because it involves groundbreaking doctrine, but because it
provides a vivid example of how far school districts have gone in their authoritarian approach to school discipline.72
But at the same time, The Schoolhouse Gate does not discuss some seminal
desegregation cases like Freeman v. Pitts73 and Missouri v. Jenkins,74 which are
worth mentioning here. Freeman v. Pitts effectively ended school desegregation
that was otherwise occurring across the South and elsewhere. First, the Court
held that schools did not have to eliminate all the vestiges of discrimination before courts could begin releasing them of supervision;75 it was enough if
schools had eliminated the vestiges in some particular aspects of their operations.76 Second, the Court articulated what amounted to an affirmative defense
to the continuing duty to desegregate. Under Freeman, schools need only show
that demographic shifts had contributed to segregation in the district.77 This
was enough to shift the burden back onto plaintiffs78—plaintiffs who had in
those cases already established de jure segregation. This burden-shifting was
devastating for plaintiffs,79 as the mere passage of time inevitably produces

70.
71.

72.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

79.

Redding, 557 U.S. at 379 (“The strip search of Savana Redding was unreasonable and a violation of the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).
Id. at 375 (“The indignity of the search . . . implicate[s] the rule of reasonableness as stated
in [New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985),] that ‘the search as actually conducted [be]
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justiﬁed the interference in the ﬁrst
place.’”).
For numerous examples of the egregious lengths to which schools have gone, the data to
support it as a systematic problem, and a potential constitutional response, see DEREK W.
BLACK, ENDING ZERO TOLERANCE: THE CRISIS OF ABSOLUTE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE (2016).
503 U.S. 467 (1992).
515 U.S. 70 (1995).
Freeman, 503 U.S. at 471 (indicating that the district court could grant partial unitary status).
Id. (“A district court need not retain active control over every aspect of school administration
until a school district has demonstrated unitary status in all facets of its system.”).
Id. at 494 (“[T]he school district is under no duty to remedy imbalance that is caused by
demographic factors.”).
Id. (“[I]n the absence of a showing that either the school authorities or some other agency
of the State has deliberately attempted to ﬁx or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial
composition of the schools, further intervention by a district court should not be necessary.”
(quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971))).
Bradley W. Joondeph, Note, Killing Brown Softly: The Subtle Undermining of Effective Desegregation in Freeman v. Pitts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 147 (1993).

2317

the yale law journal

128:2302

2019

demographic changes and, thus, the basis for districts to escape their duty to
desegregate.80
Missouri v. Jenkins81 addressed the other part of what was left of school desegregation. In those districts in which the physical integration of schools was
not possible, courts had long ordered states and districts to fund schoolimprovement programs.82 In Jenkins, the Court required plaintiffs to justify the
continuation of those programs with evidence so precise that it is practically
impossible to supply. Plaintiffs would, for instance, need to demonstrate the
extent to which current achievement gaps are traceable to prior de jure segregation.83 Having announced an immediately available defense to school desegregation in Freeman and a huge evidentiary barrier to school improvement in Jenkins, courts rapidly dissolved school-desegregation cases across the country.84
Taken together, Jenkins and Freeman were so consequential that it is hard to imagine that the Court will ever hear another mandatory school-desegregation
case.
There are no perfect answers to the questions about what one includes in or
excludes from a book. In most ways, The Schoolhouse Gate is a resounding success. Driver writes in an engaging, narrative style that covers much of the
Court’s education docket. He puts readers in the position to interpret and
judge the Court for themselves rather than rely on others’ biased points of
view. He proves that the Supreme Court has made a signiﬁcant difference—for
good or bad—in the nation’s largest governmental institution. But one signiﬁcant narrative left out of the book is a sustained interrogation of the right to
education, which we provide below.

80.
81.
82.
83.

84.

Id. at 162 (“Freeman signiﬁcantly increases the possibility that, despite years of judicial supervision, school districts will never truly desegregate.”).
515 U.S. 70 (1995).
That authority ﬂowed from the Court’s holding in Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 102 (“Just as demographic changes independent of de jure segregation
will affect the racial composition of student assignments, so too will numerous external factors beyond the control of the [Kansas City, Missouri School District] and the State affect
minority student achievement. So long as these external factors are not the result of segregation, they do not ﬁgure in the remedial calculus.” (citation omitted)).
See, e.g., NAACP v. Duval Cty. Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 965 (11th Cir. 2001) (discussing the lower-court decision in the early 1990s ﬁnding that the district had met its constitutional obligations); Lockett v. Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 839, 841 (11th Cir. 1997) (same); see also Gary Orﬁeld & Chungmei Lee, Historic Reversals, Accelerating Resegregation, and the Need for New
Integration Strategies, C.R. PROJECT 5 (Aug. 2007), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu
/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/historic-reversals-accelerating
-resegregation-and-the-need-for-new-integration-strategies-1/orﬁeld-historic-reversals
-accelerating.pdf [https://perma.cc/58JT-RSXR].
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ii. the right to education
The most basic, complex, and potentially consequential issue in education
law is whether students have a right to education. In four of the Court’s most
important education cases—Brown v. Board of Education,85 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,86 Goss v. Lopez,87 and Plyler v. Doe88—the
right to education is directly implicated. Driver acknowledges the importance
of these cases and, interestingly, seeks to elevate Plyler.89 Indeed, Driver characterizes the Court’s opinion in Plyler as one of “the most egalitarian, momentous, and efficacious constitutional opinions that the Supreme Court has issued
throughout its entire history.”90
The scope of The Schoolhouse Gate, however, requires that Driver’s treatment of these cases focuses on their facts and the narrow grounds upon which
they were decided. His effort to construct a narrative of the Court, its members,
and the evolution in the Court’s thinking across time understandably precludes
him from probing the larger theoretical aspects that we elicit here. Yet there
remains a contradiction in the Court’s own narrative. For nearly a century, the
Court has consistently acknowledged the special place that education holds in
our democratic structure.91 But the Court refused to recognize the doctrinal
implications of that status and the possibility that students have a right to public education.92 A key question thus remains unanswered: why has the Court
failed to ensure equal educational opportunity?
This Part explores this and related issues through the most prominent Supreme Court decisions touching on the right to education in three Sections.
The ﬁrst Section examines the Court’s rejection of a fundamental right to education in San Antonio v. Rodriguez. It emphasizes that the Court’s holding was
inconsistent with the lofty status Brown v. Board of Education had afforded edu85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

90.
91.
92.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Jill Lepore was the ﬁrst to notice and emphasize the important work Driver was doing on
Plyler. See Jill Lepore, Is Education a Fundamental Right?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 10, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/10/is-education-a-fundamental-right
[https://perma.cc/S6KQ-6PN2].
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 316.
See supra note 17.
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1973) (rejecting education
as a fundamental right); see also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988)
(conﬁrming Rodriguez on that point).
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cation and also created a number of practical and doctrinal challenges for the
future. One of them was the basis upon which the Court might intervene in
other egregious denials of educational opportunity. The second Section explores this intervention problem through Goss v. Lopez, a school suspension
case. Having rejected education as a fundamental right in Rodriguez, the Court
had to identify some statutory right to education that schools could not simply
take away at their discretion. The third Section explores a similar problem in
Plyler v. Doe. While Texas had clearly targeted undocumented students for exclusion from school, the Court’s prior decision in Rodriguez dictated that the
state need only justify educational inequality under rational basis review. Thus,
the Court again struggled to articulate the logic upon which it would intervene.
A. San Antonio v. Rodriguez: School Funding’s Impact on the Right to
Education
1. Implications Well Beyond Money
In Rodriguez, the Court infamously announced that education is not a fundamental right93 and that poverty is not a suspect class triggering heightened
scrutiny.94 Thus, the Court only applied rational basis review to the egregious
funding disparities between school districts.95 Driver frames his discussion of
the case almost entirely around its facts. He writes that Rodriguez was about
school-funding practices that “yielded massive disparities in per pupil expenditures between areas with high property values and areas with low property values.”96 Driver describes Rodriguez as a technical case about “tax dollars,” the
“intricacies and uncertainties of school ﬁnancing,”97 and the “desirability of
school-ﬁnancing reform.”98 He also attempts to put a silver lining on the case
by noting that advocates can still turn to state courts and state law for remedies. He tells the reader: “[E]ven if federal courts prove initially hostile to
93.

94.
95.

96.
97.
98.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35 (“Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit
protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we ﬁnd any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”).
Id. at 29 (“[T]his Court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides
an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny.”).
Id. at 55 (“The constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause is whether the
challenged state action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest. We hold that
the Texas plan abundantly satisﬁes this standard.” (citation omitted)).
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 315.
Id. at 319.
Id.
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rights claims under the federal Constitution, reformers can attain victories at
least sometimes by invoking state constitutional provisions.”99
But it is worth noting that the contrary opinion, expressed by Justice Marshall, may be the better one—that the case was a massive blow to educational
rights. Writing in dissent, Marshall framed the case as one about the “quality
of education [the state] offers its children.”100 The Court’s holding, he argued,
was “an abrupt departure” from precedent and “a retreat from our historic
commitment to equality of educational opportunity.”101 Now, the state will be
free to “depriv[e] children in their earliest years of the chance to reach their full
potential as citizens.”102
In a closing paragraph, Driver optimistically notes a recent Michigan lawsuit that takes up the question left open in Rodriguez—whether depriving students of even a minimally basic education might violate students’ constitutional right to education.103 But as Justice Marshall’s dissent reveals, the
constitutional right to an education—more particularly, the equal educational
opportunities it demands—has been the question since the beginning. The issue arises in Michigan because the Court skirted it in Rodriguez.
Driver is not the ﬁrst to label Rodriguez and the state litigation it spawned
“school-ﬁnance litigation.” But money is simply a means to an end, as state
courts and leading scholars have recognized.104 The right in so-called schoolﬁnance cases is not a right to some speciﬁc level or form of school funding. It is
a right to an adequate or equal education, and such a right can implicate any
number of issues.105 Money is just one.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

105.

Id. at 316.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 70-71.
Id. at 71.
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 329-30.
James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529, 532
(1999); see also Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 390 (2012) (“[A]dditional funding is not an
end in and of itself. Funding is relevant only because it can purchase the critical inputs, such
as teachers and curricula, which are necessary to offer students an equal educational opportunity or some qualitative level of education.”); Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v.
Board of Education: Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1355-56
(2004); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 307-10 (1999); Christopher E. Adams, Comment, Is Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in School Finance Litigation?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1613, 1642 (2007).
See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211-12 (Ky. 1989) (holding that
the state constitution “requires the General Assembly to establish a system of common
schools that provides an equal opportunity for children to have an adequate education,” that
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At its core, school-ﬁnance litigation—whether under the rubric of adequacy
or equity—concerns the constitutional right to education and its qualitative
scope.106 Plaintiffs’ primary substantive complaint is that shortcomings in
teacher quality, class size, student learning, graduation rates, curriculum, or academic standards reveal a deprivation of educational opportunity.107 This
broad understanding of the constitutionally required educational opportunity
has allowed plaintiffs to challenge almost any education policy or resource that
interferes with equity, adequacy, and access.108 Sheff v. O’Neill, a seminal case
striking down school segregation under the Connecticut Constitution, offers a
perfect example of how these rights span beyond money.109 In Sheff, the court
held that the state had an “affirmative constitutional obligation to provide a
substantially equal educational opportunity” and “extreme racial and ethnic
isolation,” regardless of equalized school funding, “deprives schoolchildren” of
their constitutional rights.110
These cases are not mere consolation prizes but rather they reveal how
much was at stake—and how much was lost—in Rodriguez. When the Court
rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to school-funding inequity in Texas, the Court rejected the fundamental right to education and every aspect of learning and equity that it touches. The Court’s holding appeared so momentous that the majority qualiﬁed its approach, allowing that plaintiffs’ claim might have
“merit . . . if a State’s ﬁnancing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children” or “fail[ed] to provide each child
with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political pro-

106.

107.

108.

109.
110.

the state had failed in that duty, and that the state had to “recreate” and “redesign” its entire
education system).
See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995) (“That
Article requires the State to offer all children the opportunity of a sound basic education.
Such an education should consist of the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary
to enable children to eventually function productively as civic participants capable of voting
and serving on a jury.” (citations omitted)).
See, e.g., Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 169-73 (S.C. 2014) (examining
transportation, teachers, and district size); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801
N.E.2d 326, 333-36 (N.Y. 2003) (evaluating teachers, facilities, and the instrumentalities of
learning).
Derek W. Black, Reforming School Discipline, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2016) (explaining
the basic logic and speciﬁc challenges to segregation, teacher tenure, charter-school caps,
and school discipline under education clauses).
678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
Id. at 1281.
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cess.”111 This type of distinction is often the work of dissenters seeking to limit
a negative decision, not the pronouncement of a majority.
2. Decades of Scholarly Outrage
As discussed above, The Schoolhouse Gate probes contemporary and subsequent scholarship as a measure of an opinion’s signiﬁcance. With Rodriguez,
Driver quotes two scholars who immediately affirmed the result and discusses
Goodwin Liu’s more recent argument that Congress has the authority to intervene in funding inequality even if the Court will not.112 But the literature on
the right to education is particularly voluminous and extremely critical of the
Court. While it is beyond the scope of Driver’s project to detail that literature,
it worth more discussion for our purposes.
Mark Yudof’s early autopsy of Rodriguez is instructive.113 He charged the
Court with casting aside doctrinal “analysis of equal educational opportunity . . . in favor of a focus on the appropriate judicial role, the limits on judicial
manageability, and the dictates of public policy.”114 Yudof emphasized that the
precise doctrinal question was whether to “declare[] education to be constitutionally fundamental.”115 But the Court’s analysis on that question was neither
full nor fair. Rather than seriously entertain the key constitutional issues, the
Court rested its decision on the uncertainty regarding the impact of relative
differences in per-pupil expenditures.116 Yudof predicted that the “Court’s unwillingness to treat education with . . . solicitude . . . may have grave consequences” in a variety of education cases having little if anything to do with interdistrict disparities in school funding.117 Yudof was correct. Fifteen years
later, for instance, the Court would rely on Rodriguez in upholding school-bus

111.
112.

113.
114.
115.
116.

117.

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 326-27; Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship,
116 YALE L.J. 330 (2006). Driver’s footnotes include some additional citations, but they are
directed at the efficacy of school ﬁnance.
Mark G. Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEX. L. REV. 411 (1973).
Id. at 503.
Id.
The Court rejected plaintiffs’ claims “because the majority—or at least Mr. Justice Powell—
did not believe that the requisite degree of injury had been established where the State allegedly provided a minimum educational opportunity.” Id. at 503-04.
Id. at 503. Yudof pointed to “intradistrict resource disparities, school exclusions, and ability
grouping practices.” Id.
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fees, even for distant families with incomes “near the officially deﬁned poverty
level.”118
The scholarly criticism of Rodriguez has continued ever since. For instance,
a decade after Yudof’s critique, Gershon Ratner argued that standards-based
reform had shown that qualitative tools can be developed to evaluate and compare districts.119 The advent of those standards, Ratner argued, imposes a constitutional duty on every urban public school to educate “the vast majority of
its students, regardless of the proportions of poor and minority students,” with
“basic skills.”120 More recently, one of us has argued that “every predicate upon
which the Court made its decision has changed,” including state-court precedent, which has shown “educational rights [to be] inapposite to the Court’s
characterizations in Rodriguez.”121 As late as 2015, Charles Ogletree and Kimberly Robinson edited a volume devoted solely to critiquing Rodriguez and
theorizing options for counteracting it.122 Scholars have so dutifully obsessed
over the case that Joshua Weishart—a full forty-ﬁve years after Rodriguez—
aptly dubbed Derek Black’s 2018 attempt to reconceptualize the constitutional
foundations of the right to education as something akin to the quest for the
Holy Grail—a quest that “has captured the imagination of the likes of Erwin
Chemerinsky and Cass Sunstein, among scores of other scholars.”123
3. Imagining an Alternative Outcome
Driver could not fairly be expected to exercise his skilled touch in spinning
alternate scenarios and hypotheticals for every case discussed in the book. Yet it
is particularly illuminating to deploy Driver’s method to Rodriguez here. The
alternative universe in which the Court would have recognized a fundamental

118.
119.
120.
121.

122.
123.

Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 455 (1988).
Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic
Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 781, 800-803 (1985).
Id at 781.
Derek W. Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First Step
Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1395 (2010).
The Court in Rodriguez “treated education as being equivalent to a state-sponsored bus
voucher that the State might freely offer or withhold,” but state courts have since held education is an absolute constitutional duty of the states. Id. at 1396-97.
THE ENDURING LEGACY OF RODRIGUEZ: CREATING NEW PATHWAYS TO EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Kimberly Jenkins Robinson eds., 2015).
Joshua E. Weishart, The Compromised Right to Education?, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 123, 123
(2018) (responding to Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Compromise to Guarantee Education, 70 STAN. L. REV. 735 (2018)).
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right to education seemed plausible, if not likely, in 1973. Prior to the Court’s
decision, several signs pointed toward the Court ruling in favor of the plaintiffs. The federal district court had held that education was a fundamental
right.124 State supreme courts were also entertaining school-funding cases that
implicated state and federal fundamental rights to education. Both the California and New Jersey Supreme Courts had already concluded that education was
a fundamental right under the state and federal constitutions.125
Most importantly, the Court’s school-desegregation precedent, as well as a
number of other liberty cases, suggested that the recognition of a right to education was just around the corner. In Brown v. Board of Education,126 for instance, the Court came close to recognizing a fundamental right. It stated that
education is “perhaps the most important function of state and local governments”—an “opportunity” which “must be made available to all on equal
terms.”127 Bolling v. Sharpe128—the companion case to Brown that dealt with
segregation in Washington, D.C.— might have gone even further.129 Chief Justice Warren’s initial draft of the opinion declared education to be “a fundamental liberty” and struck down school segregation as “an arbitrary deprivation of
[that] liberty.”130 The Court ultimately decided Brown and Bolling based on

124.
125.

126.
127.
128.
129.

130.

Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1972), rev’d, 411
U.S. 1 (1973).
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 279 (N.J. 1973) (indicating that it had already reached its
decision and written an opinion prior to Rodriguez, but had to revise its decision regarding
federal law when Rodriguez was decided), on reh’g, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); see also Serrano
v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Cal. 1971) (“We are convinced that the distinctive and priceless
function of education in our society warrants, indeed compels, our treating it as a ‘fundamental interest.’”).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 483.
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
See Hans J. Hacker & William D. Blake, The Neutrality Principle: The Hidden yet Powerful Legal Axiom at Work in Brown Versus Board of Education, 8 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y
5, 46-47 (2006) (describing Chief Justice Warren’s initial draft opinion in Bolling and its
eventual abandonment); Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 93-94 (1979) (reprinting a memorandum
from the Chief Justice on the “District of Columbia Case.”).
Hacker & Blake, supra note 129, at 47 (quoting Chief Justice Warren’s draft opinion). Warren’s draft cited Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923),
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284
(1927), for support of the proposition of a liberty interest in education. Hacker & Blake, supra note 129, at 46. He later abandoned this language, presumably in the service of unanimity, but this shift created an obvious problem that remains in Bolling to this day. Without a
fundamental right vested in liberty—a term that does appear in the Fifth Amendment—the
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equal protection principles, but that rationale was primarily to ensure a unanimous opinion.131 The cases clearly laid the ideological foundations of a right to
education. Leading advocates and scholars such as the late Derrick Bell have argued that the Court simply needed the right facts to build on that foundation.132
An alternative universe in which Rodriguez recognized a right to education
ultimately would have rewritten both school-ﬁnance history and the entirety of
the struggle for equal educational opportunity. This is not to say federal intervention is without downsides. Federal intervention would have cut short the
experimental and evolving common law development of the right to education
that eventually occurred in state courts. That trial-and-error approach has certainly produced some beneﬁts that might not have occurred otherwise.133 But
on the whole, federal intervention would have brought three positive developments.
First, a federal right to education would have secured uniform rights. State
litigation thus far has produced uneven results and plaintiffs only have viable
state constitutional claims in just over half of the states.134 States like Illinois,

131.

132.

133.

134.

Court had to infer an equal protection principle into the Amendment because that principle
is not found in the text of the Fifth Amendment.
See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 682-99 (2004) (discussing the push for a
unanimous decision).
See Christopher R. Lockard, In the Wake of Williams v. State: The Past, Present, and Future of
Education Finance Litigation in California, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 387 (2005) (noting Bell’s involvement in the litigation in Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971)).
See Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of
the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1526-38 (2007) (describing state-level educational litigation
and ensuing reforms).
Overview of Litigation History, SCHOOLFUNDING.INFO, http://schoolfunding.info/litigation
-map [https://perma.cc/X6AT-AHC7]. No obvious neutral principles of law or issues of
fact fairly explain these disparate results. The Illinois Constitution, for instance, includes
one of the most progressive education clauses in the nation, yet its judiciary has consistently
refused to intervene in what has been one of the nation’s most inequitable school-funding
systems. See Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1193 (Ill. 1996) (dismissing
the plaintiffs’ claim regarding the constitutionality of the state’s public-school-ﬁnancing system on the basis that “whether the educational institutions . . . in Illinois are ‘high quality’ is
outside the sphere of the judicial function”). Florida’s constitution likewise declares education to be a “fundamental value of the people” and imposes a “paramount duty” on the state
to provide a “high quality system of free public schools.” FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. However,
Florida’s courts have also rejected constitutional education claims several times notwithstanding troubling education inequalities. See Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam). In contrast, South Carolina’s constitution simply provides that the General Assembly “shall provide for the
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Georgia, and Florida have thus far entirely precluded school-funding challenges135 and unsurprisingly have experienced relatively high levels of funding inadequacy or inequality.136 Courts in North Carolina and South Carolina have
recognized a right to education,137 but have struggled to force their legislatures
to adopt meaningful remedies for deprivations of education.138 Only one state
has managed to both recognize education rights and consistently enforce them
over an extended period of time.139
Second, a federal right would have improved the enforcement of education
rights. Even prevailing state-court plaintiffs struggle to secure effective remedies.140 Separation-of-powers principles, the election of state-court judges, and
recalcitrant legislatures all constrain the judiciary’s ability to remedy constitutional education violations.141 Federal courts do not operate under those same

135.
136.
137.
138.

139.

140.

141.

maintenance and support of a system of free public schools,” S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3, but its
supreme court has twice sided with plaintiffs in challenges to the quality and funding of education in the state. Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157 (S.C. 2014), amended by
777 S.E.2d 547 (S.C.), order superseded by 780 S.E.2d 609 (S.C. 2015); Abbeville Cty. Sch.
Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999).
Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness, 680 So. 2d at 408; McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga.
1981); Comm. for Educ. Rights, 672 N.E.2d at 1193.
See generally BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., EDUC. LAW CTR., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT CARD (7th ed. 2018).
Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist., 515 S.E.2d at 538-40.
Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist., 780 S.E.2d 609; Wendy Lecker, Leandro Court Process Underway to
Remedy North Carolina’s Inadequate School Funding, EDUC. L. CTR., (Oct. 1, 2018), http://
edlawcenter.org/news/archives/other-states/leandro-court-process-underway-to-remedy
-north-carolinas-inadequate-school-funding.html [https://perma.cc/NR4X-24L7] (noting
the years of delay in implementing a remedy).
See, e.g., The History of Abbott v. Burke, EDUC. L. CTR. http://edlawcenter.org/litigation
/abbott-v-burke/abbott-history.html [https://perma.cc/NNZ9-G9BB] (discussing the history of the litigation in New Jersey).
See generally Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educational
Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701 (2010) (reviewing the different approaches that state courts have taken to adjudicating and remediating education-adequacy cases).
See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) (“It is [the
General Assembly’s] decision how best to achieve efficiency.”); Campaign for Fiscal Equity,
Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 58 (N.Y. 2006) (“[I]n fashioning speciﬁc remedies for constitutional violations, we must avoid intrusion on the primary domain of another branch of government.”); Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 261 (“[T]he administration of the public schools of the
state is best left to the legislative and executive branches of government. Therefore, the
courts of the state must grant every reasonable deference to the legislative and executive
branches when considering whether they have established and are administering
a . . . sound basic education.”); Derek W. Black, Averting Educational Crisis: Funding Cuts,
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limitations. Federal courts are far from perfect, but school desegregation reveals that they have the capacity to take over school systems and enforce education reform.142
Third, had the Court recognized a federal right to education, it would have
expanded congressional power to guarantee educational equity and adequacy.
Currently, Congress’s only power to promote general educational improvements and equity comes from the Spending Clause. It has used this power to
pass and fund legislation such as the No Child Left Behind Act143 and the Every
Student Succeeds Act.144 But statutes passed pursuant to the Spending Clause
allow states to refuse to participate in federal programs.145 This limits Congress’s ability to require states to reform their education practices. On the other
hand, if Rodriguez had recognized education as a fundamental right, it would
be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Because Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress power to enforce the Amendment’s substantive provisions, Congress could have required states to remedy educational
inadequacies and inequities.146 When using its Section 5 powers, Congress
need not cajole or bribe states.147 Instead, it can demand that states come into
compliance with the substantive provisions of the Amendment and allow individual plaintiffs to sue recalcitrant states in federal court to ensure compliance
if they do not.
Perhaps the fear of this alternate universe was what drove the Court away
from recognizing a fundamental right to education. Yet fear is insufficient as a
sole explanatory factor. Responding to general critiques of judicial intervention
in schools, Driver astutely recognizes that intervention concerns are often overstated.148 The Court has intervened in many controversial education issues.

142.

143.
144.
145.

146.
147.
148.

Teacher Shortages, and the Dwindling Commitment to Public Education, 94 WASH. U. L. REV.
423, 456 (2016) (discussing legislatures that had deﬁed court orders).
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (discussing the “broad”
scope of a district court’s power to ﬁx equitable remedies where school authorities have
failed to eliminate segregation).
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015).
See, e.g., Utah Set to Reject No Child Left Behind, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2005), https://www
.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/feb/22/20050222-111910-7518r [https://perma.cc/BR4E
-UNX5]. See generally Michael D. Barolsky, Note, High Schools Are Not Highways: How Dole
Frees States from the Unconstitutional Coercion of No Child Left Behind, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
725 (2008).
Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Compromise to Guarantee Education, 70 STAN. L. REV. 735,
829-33 (2018).
Id.
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 17-25.
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Thus, the better reading seems to be that the Court intervenes whenever it
wants to and laments the dangers of intervention when it is disinclined to do
so.149 Regardless, the consequences of nonintervention in Rodriguez could not
have been more signiﬁcant. Those consequences shaped much of the most important state and federal education litigation that followed it.
B. Goss v. Lopez: Suspension as a Deprivation of a Right to Education
Goss v. Lopez150 shows yet again how the right to education links the
Court’s school cases. The case involved a state statute that permitted schools to
summarily suspend students without any sort of process.151 The Court struck
down the statute, holding that students are entitled to due process prior to suspension.152 The case also, however, has two vital links to the right to education
beyond due process and a school-discipline dispute. First, note how Goss is part
of Brown’s progeny. As schools began to integrate, racial bias and discrimination began to manifest themselves in school discipline.153 Driver does an excellent job teasing out this part of the story. He devotes an entire subsection to
explaining why Goss “should not be mistaken for an insigniﬁcant opinion.”154
He argues that Goss was part of the “march toward racial equality” and a failure
to intervene would have been a “conspicuous” “snub to the cause.”155 His telling of the story implicitly substantiates our thesis that the right to equal educational opportunity is a central aspect of the Court’s education precedent.
Second, Goss confronted the issue that Brown avoided and Rodriguez did not
fully resolve—the existence and nature of a right to education. Had the Court
in either of those cases recognized a right to education, Goss would have been
an easy case for the plaintiffs to win.156 But that was a road not taken. Instead,
it was the school district that argued that the outcome was preordained:
“[B]ecause there is no constitutional right to an education at public expense,
the Due Process Clause does not protect against expulsions from the public

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Id. at 567.
Id.
BLACK, supra note 72, at 32-35.
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 157.
Id. at 157-58.
Goss may have not even made it to the Supreme Court, as due process would have clearly
attached to school actions that sought to take away a student’s fundamental right to education.
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school system.”157 Thus, the Court in Goss confronted a tough choice: rule
against the plaintiffs and ignore the blatant unfairness occurring in school discipline or identify some right that triggers due process but does not implicate a
fundamental right to education.
Pursing the latter option, the Court characterized education as a property
interest and found that property in a strange place—Ohio’s compulsoryattendance law.158 The Court reasoned that the combination of schools’ statutory duty “to provide a free education” and students’ statutory requirement to
attend those schools created a property interest or “legitimate claims of entitlement to a public education.”159 School suspensions and expulsions amount
to attempts to take that property interest away, requiring due process.160 The
dissent responded with confusion: “[T]he very legislation [that the majority
relies on to] ‘deﬁn[e]’ the ‘dimension’ of the student’s entitlement . . . does not
establish this right free of discipline imposed.”161 To the contrary, “the right is
encompassed in the entire package of statutory provisions governing education
in Ohio—of which the power to suspend is one.”162 In other words, an education statute that gives schools the authority to suspend students without any
due process is a strange place to locate a property right.
Goss shows how the right to education is inescapable in education cases.
First, in attempting to skirt the constitutional issue of a right to education, the
Court simply triggered statutory-interpretation squabbles on the same general
subject. This game is not worth the candle because statutory rights in education do not operate independently of constitutional rights to education. The
Court simplistically and incorrectly ignored this connection when it wrote that
“[a]lthough Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated to establish and maintain a public school system, it has [by statute] nevertheless done so and has required its children to attend.”163 A simple reading of Ohio’s constitution reveals
the ﬂaw. The Ohio Constitution provides that “the general assembly shall make
such provisions . . . as . . . will secure a thorough and efficient system of com-

157.
158.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Goss, 419 U.S. at 572.
The Court also indicated that students have a liberty interest in their reputation that suspensions tarnish, id. at 575-76, but later cases reject the notion that this type of reputational interest standing alone without some other tangible property interest would trigger due process concerns, see, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
Goss, 419 U.S. at 573-74.
Id.
Id. at 586 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 586-87.
Id. at 574 (majority opinion).
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mon schools throughout the State.”164 Thus, the provision of public education
is no mere voluntary legislative act. It is a constitutional duty. This constitutional duty, not simply the attendance laws enacted pursuant to that duty, implies an individual right to education.
Second, Ohio’s constitution is not unique. All ﬁfty state constitutions require their governments to provide for public education.165 This makes the
Court’s obfuscation all the more glaring and raises a crucial question: why are
education clauses uniformly present in state constitutions? The answer, one of
us has argued, is that these clauses exist and coalesce around common concepts
because they are an effectuation of the U.S. Constitution itself.166 The end of
the Civil War raised two constitutional issues—the meaning of a republican
form of government and the rights of citizens in such a government. The ratiﬁcation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the readmission of southern states to
the Union resolved these issues. Ratiﬁcation and readmission established education both as a right of citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
and as a central pillar, alongside the right to vote, of a republican form of government.167 The most persuasive evidence for this conclusion is that Congress
by statute explicitly conditioned the readmission of the ﬁnal three confederate
states on their education clauses: “[T]he constitution of [the state] shall never
be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the
United States of the school rights and privileges secured by the constitution of
said State.”168 Moreover, after 1870, no state would ever again enter into the
Union without an education clause in its state constitution.169
This deeper analysis, which eluded the Court, is directly relevant to a host
of additional issues—issues that cannot be fairly resolved without a full appreciation of the right to education. Most notably, a constitutional right to education triggers a different due process response than a statutory property right.170

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

169.
170.

OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2.
Black, supra note 108, at 10.
Black, supra note 146, at 792-93.
Id. at 781-83.
Act of Mar. 30, 1870, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81 (readmitting Texas to the Union); Act of Feb. 23,
1870, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 68 (readmitting Mississippi to the Union); Act of Jan. 26, 1870, ch.
10, 16 Stat. 62, 63 (readmitting Virginia to the Union).
Black, supra note 146, at 743.
See, e.g., King v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259, 262 (N.C. 2010) (applying a
stricter standard of review where a state constitutional right to equal educational access is
concerned); Phillip Leon M. ex rel. J.P.M. v. Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909,
913 (W. Va. 1996) (applying strict scrutiny to review a state’s interference with a right to
education guaranteed in its constitution); In re RM, 102 P.3d 868, 873 (Wyo. 2004) (same).
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The deprivation of a constitutional right requires more than just minimal due
process.171 Errors that might be acceptable in the context of a property right are
likely intolerable in the context of a sacrosanct constitutional right.172 Second,
as some state-court decisions have indicated, a constitutional right requires a
school to justify suspensions and expulsions with important or compelling interests.173 In other words, expelling a student for relatively minor misbehavior
is unjustiﬁable when access to education is recognized as a constitutional right.
Likewise, even when the school has an important or compelling reason for excluding a student, the existence of a constitutional right would require the
school to ﬁrst explore less restrictive alternatives.174
Finally, by reducing the case to an issue of statutory property rights, the
Court in Goss may not have actually provided any meaningful protection to
students subject to suspension and expulsion. Over time, basic due process has
evolved into little more than perfunctory box-checking as schools execute their
preordained decision to exclude a student.175 Rather than requiring schools to
justify exclusion as serving a state interest proportionate to or more important
than the harm imposed on the student, exclusions are viewed as justiﬁed so
long as a student has been put on notice of their misbehavior.176 This questionable standard made the movement toward zero tolerance possible.177 Additionally, Goss’s problematic framing continues to inﬂuence the way that state courts
approach school discipline.178 In sum, the aftermath of Goss offers just one

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

178.

See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (articulating a balancing test under
which the weight of the private interest affects the level of process required).
Id.
See supra note 170.
See, e.g., Phillip Leon M., 484 S.E.2d at 914 (requiring the creation of an alternative program
for suspended or expelled students).
See Black, supra note 5, at 902.
See id. at 847.
See, e.g., Ratner v. Loudoun Cty. Pub. Sch., 16 F. App’x 140, 141 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding
the expulsion of a student who technically violated a zero-tolerance policy on weapons when
he took a weapon from his suicidal friend because the district had afforded the student all
the process that Goss required). Driver also laments zero-tolerance policies but does not focus on how the Court’s doctrinal and theoretical ﬂaws create the problem. DRIVER, supra
note 1, at 158-65.
Students’ chances of succeeding in challenging suspension and expulsion are low and have
fallen further over time, although students’ chances are ironically better in state court than
in federal court due to additional statutory protections that states sometimes provide.
Youssef Chouhoud & Perry A. Zirkel, The Goss Progeny: An Empirical Analysis, 45 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 353, 381 (2008).
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more example of how the Court’s failure to take the right to education seriously
has far-reaching and negative consequences.
C. Plyler v. Doe: The Unavoidable Tension Between Access and the Right to
Education
Two years after the Court’s decision in Rodriguez, Texas passed legislation
barring undocumented children from enrolling in and attending public
school.179 In Plyler v. Doe,180 the Court struck down that legislation. Plyler has
been the subject of many competing scholarly theories and narratives.181 The
Schoolhouse Gate is extremely impressive here. Almost four decades after the
fact, Driver offers a new interpretation of the case and its context. Driver
demonstrates that Plyler was forward-thinking, not an idiosyncratic one-off.
Framed this way, he forcefully argues that the Court’s opinion in Plyler is one
of its most inﬂuential.
Driver’s rationale is compelling. He explains how the Court resolved a new
problem quickly before it could spread.182 For Driver, the proper measure of a
case’s impact is not just what it overturns or rebukes but also what it prevents
from ever happening. Had the Court permitted Texas’s exclusion of undocumented students, history strongly suggests that other states would have replicated the policy.183 But because the Court took bold early action, it shaped the

179.

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982).
Id.
181. See, e.g., Stuart Biegel, The Wisdom of Plyler v. Doe, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 46, 55
(1995) (reasoning that Plyler establishes a two-step analysis for educational inequality); Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A
Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550, 568-69 (1992)
(reasoning that Plyler straddled the line between recognizing and not recognizing a right to
education); Steven G. Calabresi & Lena M. Barsky, An Originalist Defense of Plyler v. Doe,
2017 B.Y.U. L. REV. 225, 230 (arguing that the plain meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,
when enacted, would have protected access to education for both citizens and noncitizens);
Michael J. Perry, Equal Protection, Judicial Activism, and the Intellectual Agenda of Constitutional
Theory: Reﬂections on, and Beyond, Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 329, 330-31 (1983) (emphasizing the doctrinal confusion that the case created); Ratner, supra note 119, at 834-45
(comparing the plight of undocumented students to that of poor urban students and reasoning that Plyler applied intermediate scrutiny).
182. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 353.
183. In fact, some jurisdictions have since considered bills or carried out policies knowing that
they contradict or challenge Plyler. See, e.g., Lawmakers to Debate Education for Illegals, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Ga.), Dec. 29, 2005, at B5; Benjamin Mueller, New York Compels 20 School
Districts to Lower Barriers to Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes
180.
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course of history. Outside of “prominent right-leaning commentators [who]
assail the opinion as a lawless aggrandizement of judicial authority,”184 Plyler
has remained well-settled law for over three decades. Even as anti-immigrant
sentiments have recently grown, Plyler has operated as a clear and relatively uncontroversial bulwark against efforts to indirectly exclude undocumented students.185 From this perspective, the incredible inﬂuence of the Court’s decision
renders its success invisible.
At the same time, Plyler highlights the Court’s uneasiness with its prior rejection and obfuscation of the right to education—a point that Driver does not
take up. Based on existing precedent establishing rational basis review,186 the
plaintiffs’ chance of success in Plyler was, at best, extremely low. Under rational
basis review, the state could certainly articulate a legitimate government purpose, such as saving costs and improving other students’ education.187 Excluding undocumented students would marginally further those goals.188 The perniciousness of the legislation, however, laid bare that the Court’s prior
decisions had trapped it in an understanding of public education with troubling implications. As the Court itself wrote in Plyler, education is not a constitutional right, but “neither is it merely some governmental ‘beneﬁt’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.”189 Yet no majority
existed to overturn Rodriguez or announce a new doctrine that would limit the
case’s impact. This tension helps explain the curious reasoning in Plyler.
First, the Court recounted laudatory characterizations of education from
several other cases. The language it selected is the type normally reserved for
fundamental rights: education is of “supreme importance” to the nation, “most
vital [in] . . . the preservation of a democratic system of government,” and necessary for individuals to “participate effectively and intelligently in our open

184.
185.
186.

187.
188.
189.

.com/2015/02/19/nyregion/new-york-compels-20-school-districts-to-lower-barriers-to
-immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/73XX-JSWD].
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 358.
See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 183.
Per Rodriguez, education is not a fundamental right; thus, the law would only trigger rational basis review. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). Similarly,
immigration status is not a suspect classiﬁcation; thus, rational basis review still applies. See
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982).
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 209.
Id. at 248-51 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Perry, supra note 181, at 338.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
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political system” and lead “economically productive lives.”190 The Court’s
point, it seemed, was to isolate Rodriguez as aberrational without actually overturning or challenging its doctrine. Second, it created wiggle room within existing doctrine. The Court acknowledged that rational basis review applied, but
emphasized that “we would not be faithful to our obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment if we applied so deferential a standard to every classiﬁcation.”191 The facts in Plyler, it reasoned, justiﬁed less deference because the
state had taken action “inconsistent with elemental constitutional principles.”192 The Court neither explained these elemental principles nor the meaning of its reduced deference, but the Court in mercurial fashion indicated that it
would seek “assurance that the classiﬁcation reﬂects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be
viewed as furthering a substantial interest of the State.”193
These two steps, the Court reasoned, justiﬁed striking down the legislation,
but they also produced an opinion lacking any clear neutral and replicable principle of law—a principle that has long eluded scholars and courts.194 The most
aggressive explanation for the outcome in Plyler is that it rests on a right to
some minimally adequate educational opportunity. This, of course, is the issue
that Rodriguez had left open. Thus far, however, Plyler remains entirely limited
to its facts. Lower courts have refused to apply Plyler’s closer-look review to
other inequalities and deprivations.195 The point here is not to mediate these
approaches but to emphasize that once again the right to education lies at the
core of the Court’s most signiﬁcant cases. Plyler, like the cases that preceded it,
cannot be fully understood or justiﬁed without a theory of the right to education. The Court’s convoluted opinion is a direct result of its previous failure to

190.

191.
192.
193.
194.

195.

Id. (ﬁrst quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); then quoting Abington Sch.
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); and then quoting
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)).
Id. at 216.
Id.
Id. at 217-18.
The case could be read as a hybrid, meaning that when two factors intersect—important
rights and class-based disadvantage—heavier constitutional scrutiny is appropriate, but the
Court never speciﬁcally articulates that. Or the case could be read as being about one of
those two factors, but the case does not fully stand on that either. Or, perhaps, it stands on a
ﬁnal ground: that the Constitution does guarantee access to a minimally adequate education
and, because these students had been denied education all together, that right had been
breached.
See, e.g., Martinez v. Malloy, 350 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D. Conn. 2018); Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F.
Supp. 3d 344 (E.D. Mich. 2018).
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substantiate a right to education and its current refusal to either revise its doctrine or tolerate its logical results.
iii. the right to equal and integrated education
In the absence of a general constitutional right to education, equal educational opportunity for minorities has almost exclusively been litigated through
the Court’s school-desegregation doctrines. In fact, school-desegregation cases
have consumed far more of the Court’s docket than any other education equity
issue.196 During the late 1960s and for much of the 1970s, the Court issued a
desegregation opinion almost every year—sometimes more than one.197 Those
cases involved innumerable factual details and generated several nuanced doctrines regarding when courts could intervene in school districts and what particular remedies they could and could not demand. With all that nuance, it is
tempting to get caught up in the details and lose sight of the forest for the
trees. But for those seeking to vindicate the rights of African American students, these cases were never just about the narrow issue of busing, intentional
versus de facto segregation, desegregation across school-district lines, resetting
attendance zones for a particular school, or money; these cases were all about
securing equal educational opportunity for African Americans—something far
too long denied.198
Covering this enormous body of law in a single chapter is a herculean task.
It might even be impossible if one is committed to the three-dimensional storytelling that Driver so excellently pursues. Richard Kluger, for instance, devoted
an entire book to the story of Brown.199 With far less space, Driver has to make
tough choices. One is to focus on Swann and Milliken v. Bradley and wrap them
in the narrative of “busing cases.” But as the following sections will show, these
cases defy narrow categorization.

196.

James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1370, 1363, 1392
(2000) (examining four decades of educational equity cases and ﬁnding desegregation cases
“are legion” compared to only one due process expulsion case, Goss v. Lopez, and a few funding-equity cases).
197. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 157 (4th ed. 2000) (“[In the] 1976 term,
the Supreme Court had either vacated or remanded orders for system-wide school desegregation plans in four cases.”).
198. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
199. See KLUGER, supra note 131.
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A. Parents Involved and the Spirit of Brown
The core of Driver’s chapter on the Court’s equal protection doctrine as it
relates to racial segregation in schools is an examination of Brown v. Board of
Education200 and its progeny. Driver observes, correctly, that Brown is open to
competing interpretations because Chief Justice Warren’s desire for unanimity
led to an abstractly written opinion.201 This explains why Driver bookends the
chapter with a discussion of Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1.202 Driver’s observation that Parents Involved represented
“the successful culmination of a conservative legal effort, extending back several decades, to mold and constrain Brown’s meaning” is spot on.203 The case featured one of the greatest battles over constitutional meaning in recent history.
Squaring off in one corner was Chief Justice Roberts and, in the other, Justice
Breyer. As Driver reminds the reader, the Chief Justice was relatively new to the
Court at the time of the decision, and there was some question—given that he
had disassociated himself from the Federalist Society—as to how he might view
race-conscious desegregation remedies.204 But in Parents Involved, Chief Justice
Roberts put those questions to rest.
At issue in Parents Involved were two school districts’ race-based studentassignment plans. The two school districts recognized that rigidly assigning
students to schools in their neighborhoods would predictably lead to racially
segregated schools when the neighborhoods themselves were segregated.205
Seeking to circumvent this, the districts voluntarily decided to use race in their
student-assignment plans to achieve more racial diversity in their schools. They
believed their plans paid fealty to Brown.206 The argument was sincere. Brown,
with its emphasis on the importance of equal educational opportunity and its
admonition that “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal,”207 at a
minimum suggested that school districts had some latitude to use race to
achieve integration—and arguably required that they do so. But by the time of
Parents Involved, the question had been transformed into whether exercising
such discretion violated the Equal Protection Clause.
200.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 250-53.
202. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
203. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 242.
204. Id. at 296.
205. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711-13.
206. Id. at 747 (noting that both parties believed that their position was faithful to Brown).
207. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
201.
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Writing for a plurality of the Court, the Chief Justice adopted the narrowest possible view of Brown’s meaning. As Driver correctly observes, Chief Justice Roberts adopted a “colorblindness” reading of Brown. For Chief Justice
Roberts, the student-assignment plans violated both the letter and the spirit of
Brown. The Chief Justice asked incredulously, “What d[id] the racial classiﬁcations do in [Brown], if not determine admission to a public school on a racial
basis?”208 He opined, “Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they
could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin.”209 Chief Justice Roberts thought that the problem the Court was trying to solve in Brown
was the general problem of race-based state statutes (rather than the speciﬁc
race-based segregation of African American students). Such statutes violated
the Constitution because the Constitution must be “colorblind” (not because
they disadvantaged African Americans).210 From this perspective, the invalidity
of the student-assignment plans in Parents Involved was an open-and-shut case.
Driver correctly characterizes Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion as embodying the competing vision of Brown, one that emphasized the importance of racial integration over segregation, togetherness and belonging over separateness
and segregation.211 Clocking in at over sixty-six pages and extensively reviewing Supreme Court doctrine, Justice Breyer emphatically rejected the colorblindness interpretation of Brown.212 Justice Breyer focused on the idea of
“Brown’s promise of integrated primary and secondary education that local
communities have sought to make a reality.”213 Seeking to distinguish the instant case from the Court’s affirmative-action doctrine, Justice Breyer emphasized the unique context in which the case arose. Surely local public school districts were in the best position to make good on Brown’s promise of
208.
209.

210.
211.
212.
213.

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747.
Id. Note Justice Stevens’s terse reply: “There is a cruel irony in The Chief Justice’s reliance
on our decision in Brown v. Board of Education.” Id. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens continued, “[the Chief Justice’s opinion] states: ‘Before Brown, schoolchildren were
told where they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin.’ This sentence reminds me of Anatole France’s observation: ‘[T]he majestic equality of the
la[w], . . . forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to
steal their bread.’ The Chief Justice fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who
were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white children struggling to
attend black schools.” Id. at 799 (citations omitted) (ﬁrst quoting id. at 747 (majority opinion); and then quoting ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (Winifred Stephens trans., 6th
ed. 1922)).
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 297.
Id. at 298-99.
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 803-04.
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remediating past discrimination and creating a more pluralistic society that had
tragically gone unfulﬁlled.214
Driver is at his most effective in explaining how it was that the Chief Justice
erred. Pushing aside the standard claim that the Roberts’s opinion was “ahistorical,” Driver unearths the Chief Justice’s real muse. Roberts’s plaintive cry
that “history will be heard” did not pay fealty to Brown, Driver argues. Instead,
Roberts was referencing another, less savory history. He was reasserting views
held by Brown’s conservative southern opponents. As Driver puts it, “The most
ringing portions of Roberts’s opinion sound as though they could have been
ghostwritten by Senator Sam Ervin.”215 He puts a ﬁner point on it just a few
sentences later: “While Roberts’s opinion in Parents Involved identiﬁed different villains than Ervin did in 1984, the colorblind rhetoric remained exactly the
same.”216 Thus, The Schoolhouse Gate is particularly useful because it demonstrates that Parents Involved represented the culmination of a decades-long conservative legal effort to mold and domesticate Brown’s meaning.
With the Chief Justice’s approach effectively disqualiﬁed, the reader is left
to ponder whether Justice Breyer or Justice Kennedy had the better of the argument. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion emphasized that racial diversity
in K-12 public schools is a constitutionally appropriate goal but one that school
districts must pursue via (mostly) facially race-neutral means.217 It is not clear
where Driver falls on this, although it does appear that he is somewhat partial
to Justice Kennedy’s approach as it relies, perhaps inadvertently, on Justice
Powell’s opinion in Keyes v. School District No. 1.218
Because of the framework of his book, Driver spends more time on the
differences between the majority and dissent of Parents Involved than on its political impact. He does note that “[t]he primary obstacle to realizing meaningfully integrated schools nowadays comes in the form of not an unbending judiciary but an inert body politic.”219 But it is also worth noting here that
progressive school districts were doing important work to integrate their
schools before the devastating effects of Parents Involved. While it is true that
214.
215.

216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 867-68.
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 304. Senator Ervin represented North Carolina and drafted the
Southern Manifesto, a tract signed by southern legislators condemning Brown. See 102
CONG. REC. 4459-60 (1956).
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 304.
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
413 U.S. 189, 217-53 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); DRIVER,
supra note 1, at 301; see also infra notes 260-266 (discussing Keyes).
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 305.
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relatively few school districts were pursuing voluntary integration at the time
the case was decided,220 the Supreme Court’s decision cut those few districts
off at the knees. What is more, the federal courts played a substantial role in
shutting down race-conscious remedies well before the Court decided Parents
Involved.221 Any movement to integrate schools comes against the background
of those court decisions. Those decisions have made voluntary desegregation
extraordinarily difficult. Had the Court in Parents Involved validated the student-assignment plans at issue, it would have created a clear exception to that
background doctrine and removed litigation fears. This could have freed, if not
incentivized, school districts and other state, local, and federal officials to do
the hard work of integration. Instead, the Court reinforced a strong disincentive for other districts to voluntarily integrate.
Finally, striking down community-integration plans is both malignly symbolic and normalizing. From beginning to end, the Court’s schooldesegregation precedent has played a central normalizing function. Its earliest
cases denormalized segregation and made progress possible. Later cases normalized school-district boundaries and demographic shifts, making resegregation all but inevitable. In Parents Involved, Roberts’s decision seeks to denormalize race consciousness, even for integrative purposes. In doing so, he not
only makes voluntary integration more difficult as a practical matter, he makes
it less desirable as an end itself.
Driver’s discussion of the importance of Brown v. Board of Education spends
a good deal of time arguing that too much weight is placed on Brown’s unanimity.222 He argues that the opinion left too many important questions (such
as whether other types of segregation were prohibited) undecided223 and critiques the view associated with scholars such as Jack Balkin that Brown actually
represented “an emerging national consensus on racial equality that only the
South rejected.”224 Driver also argues that Brown was more important than

220.
221.

222.
223.
224.

James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 132-33
(2007).
See, e.g., Tuttle v. Arlington Cty. Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 791 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.
1996) (striking down the University of Texas School of Law’s tiered race-conscious admissions plan using lower presumptive-admit ranges for black and Mexican American applicants).
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 251-53.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 253; see also Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA.
L. REV. 1537, 1538-39 (2004) (observing that when Brown was decided, a minority of states,
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many critics have allowed. In assessing Brown’s legacy, Driver emphasizes the
symbolic value of the opinion. He states, “Brown, properly understood, provided supporters of racial equality with a powerful rhetorical and moral weapon
that helped to catalyze the nation toward the goal of racial equality.”225 This,
undoubtedly, is true. After Brown, it was the white segregationists, not black
activists, not black parents, not black children, who were the constitutional
outliers.226 Brown shifted the defaults and put the U.S. Supreme Court, for a
time at least, on the right side of history. While Driver emphasizes Brown’s
symbolic importance, he also reaffirms its substantive signiﬁcance. An assessment of the Brown implementation cases shows why.
B. Implementing Brown: “It’s Not the Bus. It’s Us.”
Driver argues that the familiar critique of Brown v. Board of Education II227—
that “all deliberate speed” is oxymoronic—developed long after the decision,
rather than contemporaneously.228 The timing is important because it suggests
that Brown II (and Brown I before it) might have been more “muscular” than
they appear to us today. Driver explains that in Brown II, the Court was simply
recognizing its own limitations. It needed the executive branch to enforce any
constitutional mandate it might recognize. Thus, it could only go so far in its
holding. In this way, Driver speaks of Brown II in many of the same ways we
think of Marbury v. Madison229 as a decision that achieved about as much as was
possible given the political realities on the ground at the time. In this regard as
in others, The Schoolhouse Gate seeks to make a crucial point that goes well beyond education law: looking only at the doctrine gives an incomplete understanding of constitutional law. Driver implicitly embeds this point in the very
structure of the book. He dutifully focuses on the plaintiffs in each case as real
people and consistently surveys contemporary newspaper accounts and the legal academy’s reaction to the Court’s doctrine. He also grounds each case within a particular political milieu. In all of these ways, Driver attempts to present a
three-dimensional account of the Supreme Court’s key education cases.

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

primarily in the South, retained “some version of ‘separate but equal,’” while in “the rest of
the country . . . de jure segregation had effectively been abolished”).
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 312.
Balkin, supra note 224, at 1541.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 256.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Of course, Driver cannot explore all of the dynamics of every case he discusses. He correctly points out that, after Brown, the Court “abandoned any
effort to develop a meaningful desegregation jurisprudence for well over a decade.”230 This had a hugely dilatory effect on the path of school desegregation.231 The Court belatedly got back on the ﬁeld in Green v. County School
Board in 1968.232 Driver rightly praises Green for introducing the “affirmative
duty doctrine” to the school-desegregation pantheon.233 But then the Court
moved sideways and ultimately reversed course. Driver analogizes the trio of
decisions following Green—Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,234 Keyes v. School District No. 1,235 and Milliken v. Bradley236—to a traffic
light that ﬁrst “ﬂashed a cautionary yellow before turning solidly red.”237 Driver also notes that all three cases implicate “the use of busing for desegregation”238 and a distinction between de jure and de facto segregation, but there
was much more underlying these cases that is worth exploring here.
In Swann, the Court ruled—for the ﬁrst time—that federal district courts
had broad authority to order speciﬁc remedies for school segregation. The
most important and controversial of these remedies was busing. There is much
that Driver gets right about Swann. He notes how the case provided federal
district courts with broad authority to combat de jure segregation, including
the power to gerrymander school attendance zones and order race-based student assignments.239 And he unearths a key point that many forget—that the
Court in Swann explicitly recognized that school districts “retained discretion
to consider the race of students to promote integration,”240 even if district
courts lacked the power to order it. This point is important because it undermines the Court’s dubious determination in Parents Involved that the school

230.

DRIVER, supra note 1, at 243.
Id. at 262-63 (“[A]fter issuing Brown II, the Court—incomprehensibly—disengaged from
the ﬁeld for the next thirteen years.”).
232. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
233. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 263 (discussing Green, which imposed an affirmative duty on school
officials to “take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch”).
234. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
235. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
236. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
237. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 264.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 268.
240. Id. at 268-69.
231.
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districts had gone too far in their attempts to maintain racially integrated
schools. In Swann, the Court didn’t just give federal district court judges broad
discretion to chop away at educational Jim Crow; it recognized that local educators had that authority, too. The Court held that
school authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society
each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students
reﬂecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities.241
Take that, Chief Justice Roberts.
The Schoolhouse Gate provides a textured narrative about the battle over
busing in Brown’s progeny. In his discussion of Swann, Driver canvasses contemporaneous newspaper articles that emphasized busing,242 zooms in on a
suburban Charlotte homeowner who began a parental regional organization to
oppose busing,243 and analyzes contemporaneous polling of Americans’ attitudes toward busing.244 He also discusses President Nixon’s March 1970 magnum opus—his 8,191-word policy statement on school desegregation that signaled his opposition to busing.245
There is no question that busing was an enormous topic of discussion and
tension in the early 1970s.246 But also important is why busing was such a signiﬁcant domestic policy issue. Swann (and Keyes and Milliken) are about much
more than just busing.
Busing is not an inherently controversial subject. Busing is simply a mode
of transportation—a way for students to get to and from school—with a long
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

246.

Id. at 269 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)
(emphasis added)).
Id. at 256-66.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 271-72.
Id. at 267; see also Richard Nixon, Statement About Desegregation of Elementary and Secondary
Schools, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Mar. 24, 1970), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu
/documents/statement-about-desegregation-elementary-and-secondary-schools [https://
perma.cc/JT3X-X9J6] (“I have consistently expressed my opposition to any compulsory
busing of pupils beyond normal geographic school zones for the purpose of achieving racial
balance.”).
MATTHEW F. DELMONT, WHY BUSING FAILED: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE
TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 5 (2016).
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history in American public schools.247 And that history was largely uncontroversial when busing served the interests of white students. For a time, the luxury of taking a bus to school was one largely reserved for white students.248
Moreover, white students were often bused to avoid integration.249
Busing only became an issue when the race of the students taking the bus
changed.250 When busing became a means to integrate schools in the early
1970s, it took on a charged social meaning. White parents and their allies were
spectacularly successful in recharacterizing the school-desegregation issue, reframing the question in ways that had enormous constitutional, political, and
moral ramiﬁcations. They turned the question of whether black Americans
would ﬁnally achieve equal educational opportunity into an instrumental question concerning point-to-point transportation and the inviolability of neighborhood schools. As a leading scholar of the era put it, “White parents and politicians framed their resistance to school desegregation in terms of ‘busing’ and
‘neighborhood schools.’ This rhetorical shift allowed them to support white
schools and neighborhoods without using explicitly racist language.”251 School
desegregation and the drive to eliminate Jim Crow—i.e., “forced integration”—
became something that the federal government was doing to white parents rather than for black students.
In Swann, the Court approved busing as one of several means of achieving
desegregation. Driver notes that Chief Justice Burger thought that the case limited rather than expanded court authority to order busing and, thus, believed
that Swann had been misrepresented.252 Driver appears to agree with Burger’s
analysis, writing that “Swann might more accurately be understood not by the
constraints it placed on segregating school districts but instead by the constraints it placed on the federal judiciary.”253 To be sure, Swann came with more
qualiﬁcations than many civil rights advocates might have desired.254 But it is
247.

248.
249.

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 2 (“Students in the United States had long ridden buses to school, and the number of
students transported to school at public expense in the United States expanded from
600,000 in 1920 to 20,000,000 in 1970.”).
Id.
Id. (“In other parts of the South, as well as New York, Boston, and other northern cities,
students rode buses past closer neighborhood schools to more distant schools to maintain
segregation.”).
Id.; see also id. at 172-73.
Id. at 3.
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 272.
Id. at 273.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24, 30, 32 (1971) (ﬁnding that
students’ travel time may be too long in some cases and imposing neither a requirement of
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also worth noting that Swann invested district courts with signiﬁcant remedial
authority. Chief Justice Burger wrote that “[o]nce a right and a violation have
been shown, the scope of the district court’s equitable powers to remedy past
wrongs is broad.”255 This concept of judicial power allowed federal district
courts to desegregate large metropolitan areas. Of course, Chief Justice Burger
sidestepped an opportunity to issue an unambiguous nationwide desegregation
rule, one that would have applied in the North as well as the South.256 Many
southerners pointed to ubiquitous racial segregation in the North and cried
foul.257
There is also a key passage in Swann that can be read to bridge the so-called
de jure and de facto regimes that would later come to deﬁne the limits of desegregation. In a particularly trenchant passage, the Court recognized the complex
interrelationship between school and housing segregation:
In addition to the classic pattern of building schools speciﬁcally intended for Negro or white students, school authorities have sometimes,
since Brown, closed schools which appeared likely to become racially
mixed through changes in neighborhood residential patterns. This was
sometimes accompanied by building new schools in the areas of white
suburban expansion farthest from Negro population centers in order to
maintain the separation of the races with a minimum departure from
the formal principles of “neighborhood zoning.” Such a policy does
more than simply inﬂuence the short-run composition of the student
body of a new school. It may well promote segregated residential patterns which, when combined with “neighborhood zoning,” further lock
the school system into the mold of separation of the races. Upon a proper showing a district court may consider this in fashioning a remedy.258
Perhaps Swann can be read, as Chief Justice Burger would have preferred, as a
limited authorization of desegregation measures.259 But Swann’s limitations coexisted alongside equally tantalizing possibilities. Swann did not reach out to

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

any particular degree of race mixing nor a requirement to make year-by-year adjustments of
the racial composition of the student body).
Id. at 15.
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 270.
Id.
Swann, 402 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added).
Fred P. Graham, Burger Cautions Lower Tribunals on Busing Orders, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1,
1971), https://www.nytimes.com/1971/09/01/archives/burger-cautions-lower-tribunals-on
-busing-orders-says-rulings-by.html [https://perma.cc/FT4L-8U82].
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establish nationwide desegregation guidelines. But it did lay the foundation for
a case that might. Most importantly, both what was at stake and what could
conceivably have been achieved went far beyond mere busing.
C. The De Jure/De Facto Illusion
Analyzing Keyes v. School District No. 1 offers another opportunity to interrogate the de jure/de facto distinction.260 In an opinion authored by Justice
Brennan, the Court effectively embraced the idea that segregation’s causes varied by region. Keyes established that there were two different liability rules for
establishing a Brown violation. In the South, where there was a clear history of
state-imposed school segregation mandated by positive law, the Court essentially presumed liability. That was the essence of Green’s “affirmative duty”
mandate.261 After Green, the burden was on southern school authorities to
“come forward with a [desegregation] plan that promises realistically to work,
and promises realistically to work now.”262 But in the North and the West, the
presumption cut the other way. In the absence of positive law either requiring
or permitting school segregation, plaintiffs needed to “prove that the school
authorities have carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a
substantial portion of the students, schools, teachers, and facilities within the
school system.”263 This meant that plaintiffs had to show that school authorities intentionally segregated at least a “meaningful portion of the school system.”264 This distinction, in effect, created a ﬁrewall against “all out” desegregation in the North.
In order for the de jure/de facto distinction to make sense, however, there
has to be some meaningful difference between the two types of segregation.
Otherwise, the distinction loses explanatory force. Racial segregation in northern schools was and is typically labeled “de facto,” meaning adventitious, accidental, customary, or otherwise the result of private choices. Driver’s analysis
assumes that de facto segregation has some independent, explanatory force.265
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

413 U.S. 189 (1973).
Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
Id. at 439.
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 201.
Id. at 208.
Driver comes closest to acknowledging that “de facto” is a misnomer on page 280 where he
states: “[T]he Court wrongly perpetuated the ﬁction that many communities existed
throughout the nation where racial minorities simply happened to cluster due to their own
preferences, rather than being forced into racialized ghettos through a complex web of mutually reinforcing public and private exclusions.” DRIVER, supra note 1, at 280. He continues:
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But, as Richard Rothstein has recently explained in the context of residential
segregation (which dependably delivers school segregation), there really is no
such thing as de facto segregation; instead, it is all de jure.266
The validity of the de jure/de facto distinction lies at the core of the Court’s
limiting of desegregation and is a concept that decades after Keyes, the Court
was still struggling to reconcile. In Freeman v. Pitts in 1992, for instance, three
Republican appointees questioned whether demographic shifts and private
choice could fairly explain school segregation. They wrote:
[The district] claims that it need not remedy the segregation in DeKalb
County schools because it was caused by demographic changes for
which [it] has no responsibility. It is not enough, however, for [the district] to establish that demographics exacerbated the problem . . . .
[Much closer] examination is necessary because what might seem to be
purely private preferences in housing may in fact have been created, in
part, by actions of the school district. . . . [S]chools that are demonstrably black or white provide a signal to these families, perpetuating and
intensifying the residential movement.267
Moreover, the duty to desegregate schools does not go away simply because
demographic shifts occur. “[A] school district is not responsible for all of society’s ills, but it bears full responsibility for schools that have never been desegregated.”268
While it is beyond the scope of The Schoolhouse Gate to substantively interrogate the distinction between de jure and de facto itself, Driver does criticize
Keyes for requiring school-segregation plaintiffs in the North and West to
“hunt for bad actors” and for clinging to “the de jure/de facto distinction.”269

“The Court’s emphasis on discriminatory intent seems particularly misguided in the educational sphere, moreover, because it obfuscates how segregated schools are invariably the
product of some official government action, namely the assignment of students to attend
designated schools.” Id. But then in the very next sentence, Driver uses the term “de facto
segregation” in a manner that unnecessarily confuses the point. He writes: “Perpetuating de
facto segregation in schools by retaining pupil assignment plans should not, however, be
understood as tantamount to making a decision at all.” Id. at 280-81. Were school officials
“perpetuating de facto segregation”? Or were the school officials’ actions—as state actors—
directly attributable to the government and consequently de jure?
266. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017).
267. 503 U.S. 467, 512-13 (1992).
268. Id. at 514.
269. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 280.
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He argues that the Court should have adopted the approach advanced by Justice Powell in a separate opinion in the case. Justice Powell famously had been
chairman of the segregationist Richmond, Virginia, school board when Brown
was decided,270 and he had submitted an antibusing amicus brief in the Swann
case.271 Given his background, Justice Powell surprised many by suggesting
that the Court abandon regional distinctions and effectively adopt a strictliability rule in all school-desegregation cases.272 Justice Powell would have required local school boards across the country to “operate integrated school systems within their respective districts.”273 Moreover, he recognized that the de
jure/de facto distinction was chimerical. In Keyes, Powell wrote that “there is
also not a school district in the United States, with any signiﬁcant minority
school population, in which the school authorities—in one way or the other—
have not contributed in some measure to the degree of segregation which still
prevails.”274 Driver also points to the “knock on” effect that the earlier adoption
of Powell’s standard in the school-desegregation context might have had in
other areas of equal protection law. He argues that had the Court accepted
Powell’s standard in Keyes, then perhaps Washington v. Davis275 might have
come out differently.276
One would have thought that Justice Brennan would be the very ﬁrst to
sign on to such an approach. But he declined to do so. Driver suggests that Justice Powell failed to attract Justice Brennan’s support because there were
strings attached. Justice Powell would vote to jettison the de jure/de facto distinction but only if the liberals jettisoned their attachment to busing. As Driver
puts it, “Cutting against this sweeping remedy, however, Powell did aim in
Keyes to dial back the status quo in one major respect: he would not have obligated schools to bus students with the purpose of maximizing integration, even
in areas of de jure segregation.”277 Driver wishes that a deal could have been
270.
271.

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id. at 276.
Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia as Amicus Curie at 27, Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (No. 281), 1970 WL 122664 (arguing against
the “disruption” of busing and seeking racial balance “as an end in itself” while arguing for
giving school administrators “reasonable discretion . . . in assigning pupils”).
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 276-77.
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 226 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 252-53.
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
DRIVER, supra note 1, at 281.
Id. at 277; see also PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 1121 (6th ed. 2014) (“Brennan’s decision to reject Powell’s approach had
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cut. Throughout The Schoolhouse Gate, he repeatedly expresses his admiration
for Justice Powell’s elegant, nationwide approach to establishing liability for
school segregation. And Driver argues that Justice Powell’s well-known attachment to the neighborhood school might have been more ﬂexible than it
ﬁrst appeared.278 Thus, Driver’s position is that “the Supreme Court should
have interpreted the Constitution to require school districts to pursue racial integration throughout the nation regardless of their recent history—taking a cue
from Justice Powell’s opinion in Keyes, even if it declined to adopt his aversion
to busing.”279
The ﬁrst question is whether there were ever ﬁve votes for this proposition.
John Jeffries, Lewis Powell’s biographer, suggested that the answer to this
question was no.280 But given how things turned out, perhaps Justice Brennan
miscalculated and should have accepted Justice Powell’s condition. There are at
least two responses to this view. First, perhaps Justice Brennan resisted Justice
Powell because busing was the only feasible way to obtain cross-district integration. Again, busing is instrumental, not an end in and of itself. Justice Powell’s
approach would have required local school boards to “operate integrated school
systems within their respective districts.”281 Justice Powell placed emphasis on
the phrase “integrated school systems,” but the phrase “within their respective
districts” is equally if not more important.282 He favored a nationwide rule

fateful consequences, not only for the school cases, but for equal protection doctrine generally.”). John Jeffries tells the story a bit differently. On his telling, it was Justice Brennan
who offered a deal to Justice Powell: “Brennan had offered to take Powell’s views on the de
facto-de jure distinction but not on busing. The offer, however, was contingent. Brennan
would change his opinion if he could get majority support—that is, if Powell tendered his
vote.” JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 303 (1994). But Jeffries conﬁrms
the gravamen of the deal; in order to get a uniform national rule, Powell would have to give
up his opposition to busing. Id.
278. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 278 (“Powell made clear that he used the term ‘neighborhood
school’ in an elastic sense—meaning not necessarily the absolute closest school to one’s residence but instead indicating a preference for assigning students to schools closer, rather
than further, from their homes.”).
279. Id. at 281.
280. Brennan praised Powell’s approach, saying it “has the virtue of discarding an illogical and
unworkable distinction.” JEFFRIES, supra note 277, at 303. Justice Brennan believed that if he
could “eliminate the distinction without cutting back on our commitment [to eliminate all
vestiges of state-imposed segregation], . . . [he] would gladly do so.” Id. The problem was
that, according to Jeffries at least, Justice Brennan could not obtain majority support for this
view without Justice Powell’s vote. And that vote came with a heavy price. Id.
281. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 226 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
282. Id.
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mandating integration but that rule only operated within and not between districts.283 By the early 1970s, it was becoming increasingly clear that a great deal
of segregation was operating at the school-district rather than the individualschool level, as had been the case in Brown.284 “Within their respective districts” ties the Brown integration mandate to a speciﬁc and often residentially
segregated place. From this perspective, one could easily imagine that “within
their respective districts” meant “within their separate districts.” Given suburbanization and the sheer size of many metropolitan areas, it is difficult to imagine how children from different school districts would be educated together absent busing. Second, as Myron Orﬁeld has helpfully explained, the Keyes
liability rule led to overwhelming success for plaintiffs.285 Perhaps Justice
Brennan was right to stick to his guns.
Milliken v. Bradley286 is by far the most problematic of the trilogy of the early 1970s “busing” cases that Driver highlights. In Milliken, the Supreme Court
overturned a city-suburban desegregation plan.287 The Court rationalized its
rejection of the multidistrict plan by closely linking the constitutional violation
to the remedy sought.288 The constitutional violation was de jure segregation
within the city of Detroit.289 The remedy could not exceed the scope of the violation. Consequently, the Court ruled that suburban school districts that had
not formally engaged in racial discrimination in Detroit could not be included
in a larger integration plan.290
Driver opens his discussion of this case by stating that “[t]he litigation decision to target the state was driven by the metropolitan area’s racial demographics, which featured a heavily black city (served by the Detroit Public
Schools) surrounded by a ring of overwhelmingly white suburbs (each of
which operated its own school system).”291 While that description of the demographic breakdown is true, technically speaking, the reason why the plain-
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See Erika K. Wilson, The New School Segregation, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 148-50 (2016)
(describing how many of the tools used to resist desegregation operated at the schooldistrict level).
285. See Myron Orﬁeld, Milliken, Meredith, and Metropolitan Segregation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 364,
390 (2015).
286. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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291. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 284.
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tiffs sued the State of Michigan was because the state legislature had passed a
statute expressly nullifying a high-school integration plan that had been adopted by the liberal-leaning Detroit Board of Education.292 The State was a defendant because it engaged in classic de jure segregation in the city of Detroit.293 When the lawsuit was ﬁled, the plaintiffs’ attorneys were not certain
what kind of relief they wanted.294 But there was a ﬁnding of liability against
the State (which was never disturbed on appeal), and under Michigan law, education is very much a state function.295 It was against this background that
federal district court Judge Roth required the suburban school districts to participate in the desegregation remedy.
Milliken is perhaps the most important school-desegregation case after
Brown for at least three reasons. First, Milliken rewrote history. In its opinion,
the Supreme Court ruled that Roth’s remedy was not supported by the
evidence because the suburban school districts did not cause Detroit’s schools
to be segregated. According to the Court, how Detroit and its suburbs came to
look as they did was anyone’s guess, as the “predominantly Negro school
population in Detroit [was] caused by unknown and perhaps unknowable
factors.”296 But the record amply demonstrated the relationship between school
and housing segregation and the state’s (and the federal government’s)
culpability in creating the stark racial divisions between city and suburb.
Second, Milliken fortiﬁed and strengthened school-district lines, the
geographical fences that separate our children based on race and class. During
the Jim Crow era, black children were conﬁned to all-black schools. Brown later
held that kind of overt discrimination unconstitutional. The lesson of Milliken
is that, absent extraordinary circumstances, children should attend school
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Michelle Adams, Soul Force: Detroit, the Supreme Court and the Epic Battle for Racial Justice in America 95-105 (Mar. 18, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with author).
293. Milliken, 418 U.S. 717. Ironically, a recent federal district court once again recognized Michigan as a proper defendant in Detroit’s ongoing educational inadequacies. See Gary B. v.
Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d 852, 857-62 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (analyzing traceability and the state’s
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294. Adams, supra note 292, at 133; see also PAUL R. DIMOND, BEYOND BUSING: REFLECTIONS ON
URBAN SEGREGATION, THE COURTS, & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 30 (2005) (“As to appropriate
remedies, neither Jones nor the NAACP had a clear idea at the outset. They both hoped that
some form of actual desegregation that would break the back of segregated community life
in urban areas might ﬁnally be ordered, but they were more concerned about ﬁnding the
ways to prove to the court and to the country that a color line, every bit as wrong as Jim
Crow, still divided America on a racial basis.”).
295. See generally MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 380.1-.1853 (2005) (providing for Michigan’s public primary and secondary schools).
296. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 756 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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where they live. But because of residential segregation, black and other
minority students are largely concentrated in the urban core or in separate
suburban neighborhoods and, within those areas, to separate school districts.
These areas are not just racially segregated. Then as now, black children are far
more likely than white children to live in high-poverty neighborhoods. So
when it comes to neighborhood-level segregation (which, in turn, produces
school segregation), black children are segregated by race and class. Third,
Milliken provided whites who wanted to avoid desegregation with a clear-cut
exit strategy. The suburbs held out the promise of an exclusive “whites-only”
existence. Milliken did not create white ﬂight, but it certainly encouraged it.
Consistent with the framework through which Driver analyzes the Brown
progeny, he writes about Milliken as a busing case. He notes that there was a
“bitter chasm” within the black community on its views on busing.297 There
were deﬁnitely differences of opinion on busing in the black community during
that time.298 But it is helpful to dig deeper on this point.
Driver argues that “traditional civil rights organizations” and “many black
citizens” disagreed on the issues of busing, pointing to the NAACP’s public positions for support.299 While the NAACP was the largest black membership organization in the country at the time,300 its views were not just those of the organization’s board of directors. It is also important to note that Milliken was
the culmination of a larger black-activist-led movement to desegregate the
public schools in the North that dated back to the late 1950s.301 The leaders and
participants in that movement were certainly “black citizens.”302 Additionally,
as Driver notes, black newspapers “almost without exception also reviled [these
cases],”303 and black newspapers tended to reﬂect the views of the mass of the
black citizenry. Finally, the true goal of integration was not to get white kids
into black schools so that blacks could “teach or learn effectively.”304 Rather, in-
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tegration was a “tying strategy.”305 The integration approach was driven by an
understanding that
[a]s long as blacks were in separate schools, many believed, they would
always be shortchanged. Separate was never going to be equal, and the
equalization suits tended to conﬁrm this impression. The best and perhaps only way for blacks to receive an education equal to whites was to
attend the same schools. That way, white dominated legislatures and
school officials could not beneﬁt white students without also beneﬁting
black ones, or harm black students without also harming whites. Desegregation, from this perspective, was not so much an end in itself as a
means to an end. It was a tying strategy, essentially, where black students would tie their fates to white students because, as the saying
went, green follows white.306
Recent work by labor economists supports this conclusion, demonstrating the
extraordinarily positive impact of court-ordered desegregation on black students across a variety of indicia including higher educational and occupational
attainment, improved health, and reduced rates of incarceration.307 For all these
reasons, the “busing cases” were about much more than a means of transportation—they were about achieving the ends of equal access to education.
conclusion
The Schoolhouse Gate demonstrates that education law is among the most
signiﬁcant areas in constitutional law, worthy of its own independent treatment
and capable of teaching broader lessons about judicial authority and capacity.
More speciﬁcally, the book shows just how much the Court can achieve when it
chooses to intervene, even in the face of enormous cultural controversy. In this
Review, we have attempted to show that the Court’s reluctance to recognize the
full extent of the Constitution’s demands in public education leaves essential
obligations unfulﬁlled, trapping millions of children in conditions that deny
them education adequacy and racial equity.
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When the Court validates constitutional rights and norms in schools, it extends the horizon of opportunity for millions of students. Sometimes that
means students can learn to engage in political debate without fearing a repressive disciplinary response. Other times that means students will be free from
government coercion—explicit or implicit—to participate in religious activities
as they strive to deﬁne their own spiritual imperatives. The Court’s intervention can even result in the transformation of the entire structure of schooling,
prompting the transformation of broader society. School systems, for instance,
have gone from places designed primarily to serve students of one race, gender,
and ethnicity to engines of opportunity for all students. With this change, the
operative norms that purported to justify the former regime of repression, exclusion, and discrimination are repudiated.
The work of achieving equal educational opportunity is undoubtedly difficult and likely to be prolonged. Entrenched cultural forces often militate
against it, and this enterprise requires examining the nuances of educational
policy and practice, a ﬁeld replete with new and sometimes competing socialscience claims, making it uncomfortable terrain for judges. The Court, to its
credit, has not run from all of these issues. The Schoolhouse Gate cogently identiﬁes the Court’s most consequential interventions to enforce constitutional
promises of equality and freedom of conscience.
The full measure of the Court’s impact, however, requires acknowledging
both what the Court has given and what it has taken away. Driver tracks how
the Court has vacillated in its enforcement of certain rights but stops short of
what could have been a much more critical account.308 A holistic normative assessment of the Court’s interventions, noninterventions, and retractions is not
ﬂattering. The Court has said “no” to students on matters of enormous signiﬁcance quite often. The Court has also said “yes” in important cases only to later
retract or nullify the original mandate in later controversies. The net result of
the Court’s noninterventions and retractions is the perpetuation of a tremendous amount of behavior that either used to be, or should have been, prohibited. That behavior—funding inequality, resource inadequacy, segregation, and
zero tolerance—then becomes constitutionally normalized, a result that deforms constitutional expectations far beyond the public schools.
The treatment of the right to education and desegregation provides two of
the most troubling illustrations of how the Court’s education jurisprudence
disappoints. For more than half a century, the Court issued decisions that sug-

308.

This is not to suggest, however, that Driver excuses the Court. He clearly writes in the introduction that “[i]n recent decades, the Court has often foundered badly in its commitment
to vindicating constitutional rights in schools.” DRIVER, supra note 1, at 22.
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gested that education would receive special protection under the U.S. Constitution and that, in the right case, it would recognize education as a fundamental
right. But when the moment of decisive action came, the Court demurred, announcing a doctrine that would have extensive ramiﬁcations for students’
hopes of enjoying the full measure of political and economic citizenship. Nearly
half a century later, the Court’s decision in Rodriguez continues to shape the
structure of educational opportunity and governmental duty in problematic
ways.
Although distinct from the campaign to secure a federal right to education,
the effort to preserve Brown v. Board’s legacy has faced increasing opposition
from the Court. Litigants spent decades paving the way for the Court to strike
down segregation. When Brown ﬁnally reached the Court, its basic holding
conﬁrmed the value of that struggle. The Court began to build on Brown’s
foundation, issuing decisions in the late 1960s and early 1970s that vastly expanded the scope of the desegregation imperative. Regrettably, the Court then
spent four decades thwarting desegregation at every turn. By some accounts,
those decisions erased nearly all of integration’s gains, leaving our schools as
segregated today as they were in the early 1970s.309
Cases like Rodriguez, Brown, and their progeny represent opportunities for
the Court’s work to matter tremendously. While the Court has been true to the
Constitution’s commands and brave enough to follow them on important occasions, it has refused to do so in equally vital moments. Such refusals inﬂict
deep wounds. The Court may be the last resort for many young people seeking
to realize their hopes for equal access to what the Court itself describes as a
“fundamental obligation of government to its constituency.”310 A Court that
turns its back on those claims weakens the Constitution it is charged with enforcing.
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